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ABSTRACT 
This thesis extends principal-agent models with hidden 
actions, and uses those models to gain insight into issues in 
education. 
Chapter 2 gives a comparative statics analysis of a 
conventional model with a single principal and agent. It 
describes the effect on contracts of changes in the outcome of 
the principal-agent relationship, stating the results in the 
form of Slutsky equations. 
continuing with the same model, Chapter 3 allows the 
principal to choose an action and shows that this action can 
motivate the agent, and thus act as an incentive device. The 
model is extended further in Chapter 4, which allows agents to 
bargain with the principal over the outcome. In this form the 
model is an extension of a commodity exchange model with 
uncertain endowments. Using the core as a solution concept, 
contracts which survive bargaining among agents are derived. 
1 
Chapters 5 and 6 consider moral hazard in education. In 
Chapter 5 the government gives loans to students, and 
structures loan repayments so that students' future income is 
to some extent insured. The government chooses the optimal 
level of insurance, given the possibility of shirking by 
students. In Chapter 6 the government hires educators, and 
chooses the optimal compensation of educators, given that they 
2 
have an incentive to shirk. 
Both models extend principal-agent theory. In Chapter 5 
students choose the length of education, so that the length of 
the principal-agent relationship is endogenous. This may 
affect the optimal insurance of students' future earnings. In 
Chapter 6 the number of educators and the skilled wage are 
endogenous. In terms of principal-agency, optimal contracts 
are derived in a general equilibrium model in ~hich the number 
of agents hired by the principal, and their opportunity cost 
are endogenous. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 EXAMPLES OF MORAL HAZARD 
\ 
I 
The issue of moral hazard first arose in the insurance 
literature. Its essence is that insurance induces individuals 
to take less care in avoiding adverse events, when insurance 
companies cannot monitor individuals' behavior (for example, 
Arrow, 1963, Pauly, 1968 and 1974, and Spence and Zeckhauser, 
1971). The literature observes that, to alleviate moral 
hazard, insurance contracts typically exhibit some form of 
liability rule (such as deductibles or coinsurance), exposing 
the insured to part of the damages from the occurrence of an 
insured event. 
3 
It has since been noted that insurance is provided not 
only by insurance companies, but is implicit in many economic 
arrangements, which are therefore also subject to moral hazard. 
For instance, fixed wage contracts insure workers against 
profit fluctuations, inducing them to reduce effort (Stiglitz, 
1975, and, where the firm is a landlord and the worker a 
farmer, stiglitz, 1974); cost plus contracts remove the 
incentives to a contractor to avoid costs (Weitzman, 1980, and 
4 
McAfee and McMillan, 1986); fixed salary contracts to company 
managers remove the incentive to maximize the value of the firm 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976); insulation from constituents 
induces elected officials to pursue private goals (McGuire and 
Ohsfeldt, 1989) -; borrowers, who do not face the full cost of an 
unsuccessful investment, overinvest in risky projects (stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981), and product warranties provided by sellers 
1 
induce less care on the part of buyers (Emons, 1988) 0 
Attempts to alleviate moral hazard in these circumstances 
explains the existence of such phenomena as piece rates, 
sharecropping, cost plus incentive fee contracts, profit-
sharing, financial disclosure laws, credit-rationing, and 
indemnities in warranties. 
Relationships of this nature have come to be known as 
"principal-agent problems with hidden actions".2 The basic 
problem has been analyzed formally by, among others, Ross 
3 
(1973) and Holmstrom (1979), and has been surveyed by 
MacDonald (1984) and Arrow (1985). 
1.2 THE BASIC MODEL 
The fundamental structure of the model is as follows. A 
principal and agent are involved in a relationship yielding a 
range of possible outcomes w ,0 •• ,w (ranked from least to most 
1 n 
preferred), depending on which of n states of nature is 
5 
realized. 4 The principal lays claim to the realized outcome, 
and makes a payment to the agent. For instance, if the jth 
state occurs, the agent receives c., leaving the principal with 
J 
w.-c .. The probability that the jth state occurs is ~., and 
J J J 
depends on an action Q taken by the agent in return for the 
payment. The better the action, the further the probability 
distribution shifts towards preferred outcomes. While the 
principal's utility is not directly affected by the action, it 
generates disutility to the agent. This is a source of 
conflict between the principal and agent, the principal 
preferring a more costly action than the agent. 
The principal and agent are both expected utility 
maximizers. If V and U denote their respective state-
independent utility functions over income, and if U denotes 
o 
the disutility to the agent from the action, then the expected 
utility from a principal-agent contract is 
for the principal, and 
5 for the agent. It is assumed that V and U are monotone 
• . . 6 
increasing and concave, and that U is llnearly lncreaslng. 
o 
6 
Implicit in the principal-agent relationship is that the 
two parties wish to come to some arrangement. Thus, the 
principal guarantees that any contract generates the agent's 
reservation expected utility level (U). Formally, the 
principal faces' the participation constraint 
(1.2.1) EU ~ U 
The principal may face a further constraint, depending 
on the ability to effectively control the agent's actions. If 
the principal can dictate actions, then the principal's problem 
A A 
amounts to choosing a compensation scheme (c , ... ,c ) and 
1 n 
A 
action a solving 
(1.2.2) Maximize 
c 1 ,·· .cn,a 
EV subject to 7 (1.2.1) 
If, on the other hand, effective control lies with the 
agent, then the set of actions available to the principal is 
. .. h' 8 limited to those wh~ch are compat~ble w~th the agent's c o~ce. 
Formally, any action chosen by the principal must satisfy the 
following incentive-compatibility constraint: 
(1.2.3) aEargmax EU(C1 , ... ,cn ,a,)9 a' 
The maximization problem faced by the principal is to choose 
* * * (c , ... ,c ) and a which solve 
1 n 
(1.2.4) Maximize 
cl,···,cn,a 
EV subject to (1.2.1) and (1.2.3) 
Prior to any agreement, the principal and agent have 
knowledge of the possible outcomes, the probability 
distribution ov~r the outcomes, and the form of the utility 
functions. Before observing the state of nature, they sign a 
A A A 
contract - (cl, ... ,cn,a) if the principal effectively controls 
* * the action; (cl' ... 'cn ) otherwise - upon which the agent takes 
an action. An outcome then occurs, and the corresponding 
contracted payment is made to the agent. 
The standard results from this model are that, in the 
absence of moral hazard, the optimal contract exhibits perfect 
risk-sharing between the principal and agent, while, in the 
presence of moral hazard, the optimal contract sacrifices some 
risk-sharing opportunities in order to give the agent 
incentives to choose better actions. Specifically, the agent 
receives a higher payment the better is the realized outcome. 
The rationalization is that a better outcome suggests that a 
better action has been chosen. 
1.3 EXTENSIONS OF THE BASIC MODEL 
The model has been extended in various directions. For 
instance, Harris and Raviv (1979) distinguish the above 
situation from the case where the agent observes the state of 
7 
8 
nature before taking an action. Sappington (1984) considers a 
case where the agent's precontractual knowledge is better than 
that of the principal. Harris and Raviv (1979), Holmstrom 
(1979) and Gjesdal (1982) assume that the principal can observe 
a variable which contains more information about the action 
than does the observed outcome. Such monitors help alleviate 
moral hazard. 
Many principal-agent models contain more than one 
principal or agent. Holmstrom (1982) analyzes incentives in 
team production where the principal is unable to attribute a 
joint outcome to individuals. This literature further observes 
that when there is more than one agent, the principal can 
provide incentives by letting the agents compete against one 
another for given prizes. Such tournaments have been modelled 
by Lazaer and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1983), and 
Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) .10 Models containing multiple 
principals with conflicting interests in the actions of an 
agent are studied by Bernheim and Whinston (1986). 
Entirely different incentive devices are analyzed by 
Radner (1981, 1986), Hart (1983), and cantor (1988). Radner 
observes that when the principal and agent contract for more 
than one period, shirking by the agent may be detected with 
time, which acts as an incentive to avoid shirking. Hart 
formalizes the idea that the market mechanism works as an 
incentive scheme. cantor shows that when the principal is 
unable to base contracts on the outcome, the agent can be 
motivated by forcing recontracting at predetermined intervals. 
Models with double. moral hazard are studied by 
Carmichael (1983), Cooper and Ross (1985) and Emons (1988). 
They allow the principal to choose an action influencing the 
expected outcome, and show the implications for contracts when 
incentives must be created for the principal as well as the 
agent. 
1.4 NEW ASPECTS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM 
A criticism of the literature is that it ignores many 
general equilibrium aspects of the principal-agent 
1 t ' h' 11 re a 10ns 1p. For instance, there is no analysis of why the 
principal and agent find themselves in their respective roles; 
given their roles, there is little analysis of the 
circumstances under which it is optimal for both parties to 
commit themselves to writing a contract (the participation 
9 
constraint makes any contract acceptable to the agent, while 
the principal's reservation utility is generally ignored); and 
the duration of the principal-agent relationship as well as the 
number of contracted agents are exogenously given. Chapters 
4-6 below address these issues in the context of a commodity 
exchange model with uncertainty, and two education models. 
Chapters 2 and 3 are more immediate extensions of the 
conventional model. Thus, chapter 2 gives some comparative 
statics results for the models in (1.2.2) and (1.2.4), 
describing the effect on the optimal contract of outcome 
changes in the absence of and presence of moral hazard. The 
results are stated in the form of Slutsky equations. 
10 
Chapter 3 takes off from the model of Carmichael (1983), 
and is the first step towards the model of chapter 4. It 
allows the principal to choose an action, B, influencing the 
expected outcome (that is, n=n(a,B» and so removes one of the 
asymmetries of the principal-agent problem. The main 
difference between the existing models, allowing actions by the 
principal, and the model in Chapter 3 is that the latter allows 
the principal to explicitly take into account the effect of his 
own actions on the agent's action. Given positive 
aB interdependence between the actions (n >0), better actions by 
the principal induce better actions by the agent. Thus, the 
principal's actions are used as an incentive mechanism, as well 
as a productive input. Chapters 4 and 5 describe models in 
which n may depend on more than one variable. 
The situations discussed in chapter 3 follow the 
literature in assigning all bargaining power to the principal. 
When this asymmetry is removed, the principal-agent problem 
becomes a natural extension of the conventional commodity 
exchange model with uncertainty. Chapter 4 describes a 
multi-agent exchange model with uncertain endowments, and 
11 
extends this model by allowing each agent to choose an action 
which influences the probability distribution over the 
endowments. The model is a general equilibrium version of the 
models in (1.2.2) and (1.2.4). By eliminating the 
participation constraint, agents are no longer guaranteed their 
opportunity cost under exchange. On the other hand, each may 
achieve more than his opportunity cost through bargaining. The 
principal-agent relationship is now symmetric - each party has 
an explicitly defined opportunity cost, has the ability to 
bargain, and is a potential source as well as victim of moral 
hazard. 
The possibility of bargaining among agents raises the 
question of what conditions (regarding the nature of bargaining 
and the environment) will generate acceptable contracts. The 
usual formulation of the principal-agent model is unable to 
answer that question, because it assumes, implicitly, that the 
principal and agent have agreed to cooperate (at issue are the 
terms of the cooperation). The concept of the core is used to 
address the issue. 
The model is not unlike the mUlti-agent model of 
Holmstrom (1982) in which members of a team contribute effort 
towards a common output. Holmstrom, however, does not consider 
whether the contracts in question are also in the core. 
A different interpretation of the model considers the 
actions of agents as public goods (Holmstrom (1982) and Radner 
12 
(1986) point out the free-rider problem in models where several 
agents contribute to a common output). Given that each action 
affects a common probability distribution, every agent benefits 
fully from, and cannot be excluded from the action. Hence, the 
action is like a pure public good. In this sense, the analysis 
is part of the literature on the core of mixed (private and 
public) goods economies. Initiated, among others, by Shapley 
and Shubik (1969) in the context of externalities, and Foley 
(1970) for the case of pure public goods, few general results 
are available about the nature of the core. The source of the 
problem is the difficulty of coalitions in becoming independent 
of non-members (the complementary coalition) who supply public 
goods. The literature has therefore restricted attention to 
special types of public goods economies. For example, Pauly 
(1967) and Wooders (1978) assume away interaction among 
coalitions by considering local public goods economies; 
Rosenthal (1971) and Richter (1974) impose rationality 
conditions upon the complementary coalition, reducing its 
ability to upset a given coalition; Telser (1982) confers the 
right to public good supply decisions upon majority coalitions. 
The analysis below is in the spirit of such approaches. 
Although actions are like pure public goods in the sense 
described above, there are limitations on the set of feasible 
actions. Further, restrictions are imposed which reduce the 
interdependence among agents, and the desire or ability of 
13 
agents to upset given coalitions. 
MacDonald (1984) suggests a further connection with an 
established approach, namely the game-theoretic literature on 
revelation mechanisms (for example, Hurwicz, 1972, Townsend, 
12 1979, Palfrey and srivastava, 1986 and 1989 ). In the context 
of an exchange model with uncertainty and private information 
about agents' characteristics, the problem is to design 
mechanisms which elicit truthful messages about the 
characteristic. The model below, in which agents choose 
actions, is a variation - rather than elicit truthful messages, 
agents wish to induce appropriate actions. This proves to be a 
major difference in the analysis of the core - in the private 
information models, the message of agents who do not belong to 
a coalition is of no importance to the coalition, so that the 
interdependence problem discussed above does not exist. 
A feature of the commodity exchange model is that the 
duration of the principal-agent relationship as well as the 
number of contracted agents are fixed.
13 
In practice, 
principal-agent relationships may affect some, but not all 
periods of an agent's life, or some, but not all sectors of the 
economy. This raises questions involving the optimal duration 
and optimal extent of activities which are subject to moral 
hazard, and introduces feedback effects for which the exchange 
model (and hence special cases such as (1.2.2) and (1.2.4)) is 
a poor framework. For instance, the individual's work-leisure 
14 
choice determines the duration of the firm-worker relationship. 
similarly, moral hazard may be a serious problem in some firms, 
while not in others. The individual's work-leisure choice, and 
the choice of entrepreneurs (or central planner in a non-market 
economy) among alternative activities, is likely to depend on 
the existence of moral hazard. 
Chapters 5 and 6 are initial attempts to address these 
issues. Both are in the context of human capital formation -
in chapter 5 the duration of principal-agent contracts is 
endogenous; in chapter 6 the number of contracted agents is 
endogenous. 
The model in chapter 5 is based on the models of Levhari 
and Weiss (1974) and Eaton and Rosen (1980), in which 
individuals choose the amount of education to maximize lifetime 
utility. Its starting point is the observation by Eaton and 
Rosen that, if the return to education is uncertain, the tax 
system can provide insurance. Unlike their model, the cause of 
uncertainty is made explicit (individuals may graduate or 
fail), and the uncertainty is endogenous (the chances of 
graduating depend on individuals' effort and the length of the 
education program). There are no private markets for capital 
or insurance, so that the government finances education by way 
of loans, and structures loan repayments to insure individuals 
against failure. As long as there is some insurance
14 
(that 
is, graduates repay more than failures) student effort 
generates a positive externality by raising the expected loan 
repayment. Hence, there is a principal-agent problem. 15 
15 
The model is more general than the basic single agent 
model described earlier, because individuals, in addition to 
choosing the level of effort, choose the length of the 
education program. Thus, the duration of the principal-agent 
contract is endogenous. The main issues are whether the usual 
result of incomplete risk-sharing when there is moral hazard 
still holds, and whether the optimal level of insurance is 
affected when the duration of the principal-agent relationship 
(as well as the agent's action) affects the expected outcome. 
A shortcoming of the model is that it describes a 
partial equilibrium. Specifically, it is always optimal to 
acquire an education (in terms of the principal-agent 
literature, since all individuals choose an education, the 
number of agents contracted by the principal is exogenous); and 
there is an incomplete link between the relative amount of 
skill and the relative return to skill. 
Manning (1975, 1976, 1985) describes a general 
equilibrium model which overcomes both problems. Labor is used 
in the production of a good, but it is optimal to educate some 
individuals before they enter the workforce. The optimal size 
of the education sector is determined by a welfare-maximizing 
planner. Unlike the model in Chapter 5, the model in Chapter 6 
recognizes that the cost of education involves the cost of 
16 
hiring educators, as well as the cost of students' foregone 
earnings. Further, educators may have an incentive to shirk. 
If other factors, such as the quality of students, also 
influence students' performance, and the planner cannot observe 
those factors nor the activities of educators, then the 
educators may shirk without detection. To alleviate such moral 
hazard the planner offers performance-dependent contracts, 
penalizing educators for observed poor class performance. The 
chapter discusses properties of such contracts. 
From the point of view of principal-agency, the planner 
16 
is like a principal and the educators act as agents. The 
model is novel, because in order to derive the optimal 
contract, the planner must determine the optimal number of 
educators and their opportunity cost. 
1.5 NOTES 
1. See also Zeckhauser (1970), Kihlstrom (1971), Mirrlees 
(1976), Harris and Raviv (1978), Hurwicz and Shapiro (1978), 
Shavell (1979a, 1979b and 1982), and Gjesdal (1988). 
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2. Principal-agent models with hidden information (that is, 
adverse selection models) are not considered. 
3. See also Harris and Raviv (1979), Shavell (1979b), and 
Grossman and Hart (1983). 
4. The model has been analyzed with discrete as well as 
continuous outcomes. The discrete version is given here, 
because in the following chapters (except Chapter 2) outcomes 
are limited to two possibilities. 
5. To avoid technical problems, much of the literature 
assumes that the agent's utility function is separable in 
income and effort. 
6. Results are available for more general formulations (for 
instance, some assume strictly convex Uo )' but a constant 
marginal disutility from the action suffices in the following 
analyses. 
7. The optimal action is implemented by way of a "forcing" 
contract (for example, Harris and Raviv, 1979) the form of 
which is given in Appendix 2 of Chapter 4, section 4.13. 
8. That is, the principal can only "choose" actions which, 
given the compensation scheme, are willingly chosen by the 
18 
agent, because they maximize the agent's expected utility. If 
only one action maximizes the agent's expected utility, then 
the principal in essence has no choice. 
9. The early literature replaces this constraint by the 
first-order condition for an interior maximum of the agent's 
expected utility, namely 8EUj8a=O. Mirrlees (1975) observes 
that this condition is neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
incentive-compatibility constraint to be satisfied. Mirrlees 
and subsequently Rogerson (1985), Brown and others (1986), and 
Jewitt (1988) derive conditions under which the "first-order 
approach" (that is, replacing (1.2.3) with 8EUj8a=O) is valid. 
The models below assume that the Mirrlees-Rogerson conditions 
hold. These are the monotone likelihood ratio condition 
(MLRC) : 
=> \fi,j \fa 
where G(alwj) is the posterior probability, given that outcome 
Wj is observed; and the convexity of the distribution function 
condition (CDFC): 
, , 
F. (a) ;:: 0 
J 
\fj, \fa 
j 
where F.= ~ ~h(a). Intuitively, the MLRC states that a higher 
J h=l 
outcome is evidence that the agent has worked harder. In this 
sense effort is productive. The CDFC states that effort is 
19 
subject to diminishing returns. 
10. See also Mookherjee (1984), Malcomson (1984, 1986), 
Rosen (1986) and Bhattacharya and Guasch (1988). 
11. Some of these are observed in McDonald's survey. 
12. See also, Dasgupta and others (1979), Myerson (1979), and 
Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986). 
13. If there is no core, both are zero~ if there is a core, 
then the duration of any contract equals the timeframe of the 
model, and involves all agents. 
14. It is shown that some insurance is optimal. 
15. Although the government writes contracts with many 
students, this is a multi-agent model only in the trivial 
sense. Each student writes a contract with the government 
independently of other students. 
16. As in Chapter 5, this is a multi-agent model only in the 
trivial sense. Each educator contracts with the government 
independently of other educators. 
20 
CHAPTER 2 
COMPARATIVE STATICS OF A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL 
2~1 INTRODUCTION 
McDonald's 1984 survey of the principal-agent literature 
points out that the comparative statics of the agency problem 
are yet to be fully worked out. The objective below is to 
provide some of that analysis for the principal-agent models in 
(1.2.2) and (1.2.4). Effects on the optimal principal-agent 
contract of changes in the outcomes faced by the principal are 
described. The results are given in the form of Slutsky 
equations, obtained by applying the generalized Slutsky system 
of Chichilnisky and Kalman (1977, 1978). In their 1977 paper, 
the authors derive Slutsky equations for a very broad class of 
constrained maximization problems, including problems with 
parameters entering the objective function, and multiple 
constraints, such as the principal-agent problem. 
section 2.2 states the generalized Slutsky system, and 
reexpresses it in the form of elasticity relationships. 
sections 2.3 and 2.4 impose the restrictions implied by the 
principal-agent models in (1.2.2) and (1.2.4), respectively. 
The Slutsky equations in elasticity form allow some 
observations about the responsiveness of contracts to outcome 
21 
changes. section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 THE SLUTSKY EQUATIONS 
Chichilnisky and Kalman derive a Slutsky-type 
decomposition for a general constrained maximization problem of 
the form 
(2.2.1) Max 
x 
f(x,a) 
s.t. g(x,a)=b 
where f is an objective function, g is a p-vector of constraint 
functions, x is an n-vector of instruments, a is an m-vector of 
1 parameters, and b is a p-vector of constraint parameters. In 
the well-known Slutsky equation of the consumer choice model, 
changes in income hold constant the consumer's utility, to 
derive the sUbstitution effects of price changes. As 
Chichilnisky and Kalman point out, in model (2.2.1), anyone of 
the constraint parameters, as well as linear combinations 
thereof, can be used to hold constant the value of f in 
response to a change in one of the parameters, aI' ... ,am. 
A 
Slutsky-type decomposition exists for each method of holding 
constant the value of f. If the parameter b
k 
is used to make 
such a compensation, then the authors derive the following 
Slutsky-type decomposition near the optimal value of x: 
(2.2.2)2,3 ax + ax ag 
aa ab aa 
= ax + ax[¢>a g - J.t'~] 
aa lf ab aa aa 
where 
ax, 
~ 
I denotes the effect of a change in a J, on xi' aa j f 
holding f constant; 
1 
o 
1 
1 
with 0 in all unfilled places; 
p - [ 0 • • 0 ~k 0 • • 0 1 
and >'==(>'1" .. '>'p) is the p-vector of Lagrange multipliers in 
L(x,>.,a,b) == f(x,a) + >.(g(x,a) - b)' 
The Slutsky system in (2.2.2) relates the effects on x 
of changes in the parameters and constraint parameters. It 
states that if a programming problem can be described by 
(2.2.1), then the effect on x, of a change in a, can be 
]. J 
decomposed into 
-the effect on xi of a change in b
k
, calculated to hold f 
22 
constant; and 
-the effect on x. of a compensated change in a., where 
1 ) 
"compensated" denotes tha·t f is held constant by the above 
change in b
k
. 
The Slutsky equations can be reexpressed in elasticity 
form. Since the coice of b
k 
affects the values of the 
derivatives below, each elasticity is conditional on that 
choice. 
a. aX i e .. - ) 1) x. aaj 1 
i=l, ... ,n j=l, ... ,m 
a. aX i n .. "" 
) 
aaj If 
1) 
Xi 
i=l, ... ,n j=l, ... ,m 
bk ax. 
U ik 
1 
"" 
x. abk 1 
i=l, .•. ,n k=l, •.. ,p 
Ahaj 
agh 
h --
Sjk"" aa. ) j=l, ... ,m h,k=l, ... ,p 
Akbk 
a. af 
) --
sp+l= 
aa j 
jk -
Akbk 
j=l, ... ,m k=l, .. ,p 
23 
The first three terms measure the elasticity of x. with respect 
1 
to, respectively, a change in a., a change in a. holding f 
) ) 
. b h d p+l measure the value constant, and a change 1n k. Sjk an Sjk 
24 
(in units of the kth constraint parameter) of a., generated by 
J 
its effect on, respectively, the hth constraint function and 
the objective function. 
A typical entry in (2.2.2) (with (ax/ ab) (ag/ aa) taken to 
the right-hand $ide) is 
(2.2.3) 
i=l, ... ,n j=l, ... ,m k=l, ... ,p 
a· 
Multiplying (2.2.3) by J gives 
xi 
(2.2.4) e .. = n .. -
l.J l.J 
i=l, ... ,n j=l, ... ,m k=l, ••. ,p 
2,3 APPLICATION: A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL WITH ENFORCEABLE 
ACTIONS 
Let m=n-l' and p=l. Let a. i=l, ... ,n-l be the outcome in 
l. 
state i of a principal-agent relationship with a1< ... <an_1 ; let 
x. i=l, ... ,n-l be the payment from principal to agent in state 
l. 
i; and let x be the agent's effort. Define 
n 
n-l 
f(x,a) = ~ nh(xn)v(ah-xh ) h=l 
n-l 
gl(x)~ E (nh(xn)U(xh )) h=l 
- x n 
where nh is the probability that ah 
occurs, V and U are the 
utility functions of the principal and agent, V is linearly4 
25 
increasing in a~-xh; U is strictly concave and increasing in 
X
h i 
and the Mirrlees-Rogerson conditions validating the first-
order approach are satisfied.
5 
Let b
l 
denote the agent's 
reservation price (that is, the minimum expected utility level 
required to induce the agent to accept a contract from the 
principal). If the principal controls the payments and the 
action of the agent, then (assuming that the agent is paid 
exactly the reservation price), the principal-agent problem is 
(2.3.1) Max 
x 
f(x,a) 
Problem (2.3.1) is a special case of problem (2.2.1), so that 
application of (2.2.3) and (2.2.4) gives a relationship between 
the effect on the principal-agent contract of changes in 
outcomes and changes in the agent's reservation price. using 
and af =n . (x ) V' (a . -x . ) 
aa. J n J J 
J 
j=l, ... ,n-l gives 
(2.3.2) = 
i=l, ... ,n j=l, ... ,n-l 
or in elasticity form 
where 
i=l, ... ,n j=l, ... ,n-l 
Kj(xn)ajv' (aj-Xj) 
Alb l 
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To explain the Slutsky equations, Table 1 (which is 
derived in Appendix 1, section 2.6) gives the signs of the 
derivatives in (2.3.2). These depend on whether a favorable 
(that is, relatively large) or unfavorable outcome has changed. 
The notion of a favorable outcome is made precise in: 
Definition 1 
a. is a favorable (an unfavorable) outcome iff K! ~ «) 0 
J J 
j=l, •.. ,n-l. 
Given the agent's action x , the monotone likelihood ratio 
n 
condition, identified by Mirrlees and Rogerson, defines 
rE(l,n-l] such that K!~O if and only if j~r.6 Definition 1 
J 
then states that a. is favorable if and only if j~r. Appendix 
J 
1 derives the results that an increase in favorable outcomes 
leads the principal to specify larger payments and higher 
effort, while the effect of increases in unfavorable outcomes 
is the opposite. Further, increases in the agent's reservation 
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price are met by a combination of higher payments and lower 
effort: 
Table 17 
a. 
J 
a. 
J 
b l 
j<r r~j 
Xi + + 
i~n-l 
xn + 
The Slutsky equations can be explained as follows. The 
principal has to decide on an optimal tradeoff between effort 
8 
and payments. The higher the level of effort, the larger the 
payments necessary to compensate the agent. The optimal 
tradeoff depends (among other things) on the size of the 
outcomes. The left-hand side of the Slutsky equations show how 
effort and payments actually change if the outcomes change. 
The right-hand side decomposes this into two effects. An 
increase in any outcome makes the principal, who appropriates 
the increase, better off. Suppose that there is no such 
utility effect. Specifically, suppose that the agent's 
reservation price increases sufficiently to hold constant the 
principal's expected utility. Then the effect of the outcome 
change on the terms of the contract is a pure sUbstitution 
effect, and is measured by the first term in each Slutsky 
equation. Now consider the utility effect. The increase in 
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expected utility experienced by the principal is equivalent to 
a fall in the agent's reservation price. The resulting effect 
on the contract is measured by the second term in each Slutsky 
equation. 
A use of the Slutsky equation is that knowledge of the 
responsiveness of contracts to changes in the agent's 
reservation price gives an idea of the responsiveness of 
contracts to outcome changes. Table 1 implies that e, ,>0 iff 
1J 
r~j vi=l, ... ,n j=l, ... ,n-l; uil>O i=l, .•. ,n-l, Unl<O, and 
Sjl>O j=l, ... ,n-l. The responsiveness of the contract to 
outcome changes is measured by the absolute value of e, ,. The 
1J 
equations in (2.3.3) state that, the smaller the elasticity of 
payments with respect to the agent's reservation price (the 
smaller is u, i=l, ..• ,n-l), and the larger the elasticity of 
11 
effort with respect to the agent's reservation price (the 
larger is -u
nl
), the larger is the elasticity of payments and 
effort with respect to changes in favorable outcomes (the 
I ' , , ) arger 1S e" l=l, ... ,n J~r . 
1J 
This result can be explained in 
terms of the sUbstitution and utility effects identified above. 
Suppose that a favorable outcome increases. To make 
that outcome more likely, the principal sUbstitutes towards 
larger payments to obtain higher effort. The increase in the 
outcome has a utility effect similar to a fall in the agent's 
reservation price, namely a fall in payments and increase in 
effort (see Table 1). Since the utility effect on payments 
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opposes the sUbstitution effect, whereas the utility effect on 
effort reinforces the sUbstitution effect, the less responsive 
are payments, and the more responsive is effort, to changes in 
the agent's reservation price, the more responsive are payments 
and effort to the given outcome change. 
On the other hand, an increase in an unfavorable outcome 
causes the principal to sUbstitute towards lower payments and 
lower effort. In this case the utility effect on payments 
(effort) reinforces (opposes) the sUbstitution effect. Hence, 
equation (2.3.3) further predicts that the smaller (greater) 
the elasticity of payments (effort) with respect to the agent's 
reservation price, the smaller the elasticity of payments and 
effort with respect to unfavorable outcome changes (the smaller 
is -e .. i=l, ... ,n-l j<r). 
1J 
2.4 APPLICATION: A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL WITH UNENFORCEABLE 
ACTIONS 
If the principal controls the payments and the agent 
controls the action, then, assuming binding constraints, the 
principal's problem is 
(2.4.1) Max 
x 
f(x,a) 
k=l,2 
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where f and gl are defined as in section 2.3 and constrained by 
the conditions outlined there; the condition that -~l'/~l is 
relatively, large is imposed;9 b2=0 and 
= 
The second constraint is the incentive-compatibility 
constraint, given validity of the first-order approach (see 
note 9, Chapter 1). 
In this problem there are two constraint parameters, 
namely b
l
, measuring the agent's reservation price, and b2 , 
measuring the change in the agent's expected utility, when 
there is an infinitesmal change in effort. A change in b2 
amounts to a change in the form of the agent's expected utility 
function. Hence, it is more natural to hold f constant by 
changing b
l
, in response to a change in the outcomes. 
Application of (2.2.3) and (2.2.4) again gives the 
Slutsky equations in (2.3.2) and (2.3.3). In this case they 
hold near the second-best optimum. To simplify calculations, 
Table 2 (derived in Appendix 2, section 2.7) reports the signs 
of the derivatives in (2.3.2) when there are only two possible 
10 outcomes. An increase in the favorable outcome a 2 (as 
defined in section 2.3) causes an increase in effort and 
payment in the favorable state, and a decrease in payment in 
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the unfavorable state. The effect is opposite for an increase 
in the unfavorable outcome a
l
, An increase in the agent's 
reservation price leads to higher payments and higher effort. 
Table 2 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
Table 2 implies that e, ,>0 iff i=j i,j=l,2, e <0, e >0, u, >0 
1J 31 32 11 
i=l,2,3, and Sjl>O j=l,2. Equation (2.3.3) therefore predicts 
that the larger (smaller) the elasticity of payments in the 
unfavorable (favorable) state, and the smaller the elasticity 
of effort, all with respect to changes in the agent's 
reservation price (the larger is ull ' and the smaller are u21 
and u
31
), the larger the elasticity of payments and effort with 
respect to changes in the favorable outcome (the larger are -
e
12
, e
22
, and e
32
). 
For instance, suppose that the favorable outcome 
increases. The sUbstitution effect is that the principal wants 
to make that outcome more likely, which requires a higher 
effort. Unlike problem (2.3.1), higher effort cannot be 
enforced - effort can be affected only by creating incentives 
to the agent via the payments, ThUS, the principal raises 
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(lowers) payment in the event of a large (small) outcome. The 
utility effect is that the principal has a higher expected 
utility. This is like a ~all in the agent's reservation price, 
which would induce lower payments and effort (see Table 2). 
Since the utility effect on payments in state 1 reinforces the 
sUbstitution effect, while the utility effect on payments in 
state 2 and on effort opposes the sUbstitution effect, greater 
responsiveness of state 1 payments, and smaller responsiveness 
of state 2 payments and effort to changes in the agent's 
reservation price imply greater responsiveness of the contract 
to changes in the favorable outcome. 
An analogous argument explains why greater responsive-
ness of payments in state 1, and smaller responsiveness of 
payments in state 2 as well as effort, to changes in the 
agent's reservation price are associated with smaller 
responsivess of the contract to changes in the unfavorable 
outcome. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
Chichilnisky and Kalman's system of generalized Slutsky 
equations gives insight into the response of principal-agent 
contracts to exogenous disturbances in the outcomes. Rewriting 
the equations in terms of elasticities, gives a relationship 
between the responsiveness of contracts to changes in the 
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agent's reservation price, and the responsiveness of contracts 
to outcome changes. 
As an example, consider a worker who carries out 
observable tasks for a firm in return for a fixed wage. The 
firm's profits"which may turn out high or low, determine the 
level of wages and effort (that is, whether both will be 
relatively high or low). Suppose that the firm experiences an 
increase in the profits that will be realized if business turns 
out to be good. Suppose further, that the firm has frequently 
rewritten the contract, due to changes in the worker's 
opportunity cost. Equation (2.3.3) states that the larger were 
the proportionate adjustments in wages, and the smaller the 
proportionate adjustments in effort, the larger will be the 
proportionate upward adjustment in wages and effort due to the 
increase in profits. 
34 
2.6 APPENDIX 1 - DERIVATION OF TABLE III 
The first-order conditions of problem (2.3.1) (evaluated 
at the optimum) are 
i=l, .•. ,n-l 
Total differentiation of the first-order conditions gives the 
system of equations 
o 
o 
(2.6.1) 0 = 
L n-ln-l 0 
0 0 Lnn 
nA l dXn . . . . . L 
All Aln 
0 dAl L . . . . . L 
o 
(0) 
nn-1 • p 
• • 0 
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o l::J 
1 
where (0) is an n-1 by n matrix of zeros and da=(da1 , ... ,dan_1) 
i=l, ... ,n-1 
i=l, ... ,n-1 
iff j<r j=1, ... ,n-1 
The second-order conditions require that, at the optimum, the 
coefficient matrix on the left-hand side of (2.6.1) is negative 
semi-definite. The results in Table 1 follow from the 
properties of rr, V and U, and from the application of Cramer's 
rule to (2.6.1). 
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2.7 APPENDIX 2 - DERIVATION OF TABLE 2 
The first-order conditions of problem (2.4.1) (evaluated 
at the optimum) are 
i=1,2 
Total differentiation of the first-order conditions gives the 
system of equations 
Lll 0 L13 L 
lAl 
L 
lA2 
dXl 
0 L22 L23 L 
2Al 
L 
2A2 
dX2 
(2.7.1) L3l L32 L33 0 
3A 2 dX3 L = 
L 
All 
L 
A12 
0 0 0 dAl 
L 
A2l 
L 
A22 
L 
A23 0 0 dA2 
0 0 0 da1 
0 0 0 da2 
p31 p32 0 db 1 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
where 
7r ' , 
> 0 if i=l and 1 is relatively large 
-7r1 
< 0 if i=2 
iA2 
L = 7rIUI (i) < (» 0 if i=1(2) 
i=1,2 
(if 7r" ':::::;0) 
The second-order conditions require that, at the optimum, the 
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coefficient matrix on the left-hand side of (2.7.1) is negative 
semi-definite. The results in Table 2 follow from the 
properties of ~, V and U, and application of Cramer's rule to 
(2.7.1) • 
38 
39 
2.8 NOTES 
1. This is the terminology used by Kalman and Intri1igator 
(1973), who were the first to provide a generalized system of 
Slutsky equations. 
2. Notation is as follows. If x is an n-vector and y is an 
m-vector, then 
aXl aXl . . . . . . ---
aYl aYm 
ax = 
ay 
aXn aXn . . . . . . 
aYl aYm 
Xl is the transpose of x. 
3. The terms on the left-hand side are observable effects, 
while the terms on the right-hand side are unobservable 
effects. 
4. If the principal is risk-averse, the Slutsky-type 
decomposition is complicated by the desire of the principal to 
find a new way of spreading the risk associated with the 
outcomes, when one of the outcomes changes. It is difficult to 
derive general results for this case. 
5. These are the monotone likelihood ratio and convexity of 
the distribution function conditions, which guarantee that the 
solution to the principal-agent problem in (2.3.1) below 
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describes an action, which maximizes the agent's expected 
utility (see note 9, Chapter 1). 
6. The monotone likelihood ratio condition can be stated as 
1rh+1 (·) 
'1r h+1 ( • ) 
h=l, ... ,n-2 
(see Milgrom, 1981). Thus, if 1r! ~«) 0 then 1r! ~«) 0 
~ J 
vj >«) i. 
(Suppose not. For instance, let 1r!~0, 1r!<0 with j>i. Then 
~ J 
which does not satisfy the MLRC.) 
Define r such that 1r' 1<0 and 1r'~0. r- r 
7. If the principal is risk-averse, the effect described in 
note 4 may lead to reversal of some signs. 
8. Given risk-neutrality of the principal, payments are 
equal across states (see, for instance, Harris and Raviv, 
1979) . 
9. This is suggested by the second-order conditions. 
Specifically, the second-order conditions hold if (1ri)2_1ri'~0 
(thus, the condition i~ sufficient). This is satisfied by 
functions such as 1r(x )=x i x e(O,l) and 1r(x )=logx 
n n n n n 
X e ( 1 , exp ( 1) ) . 
n 
10. More general results are not available. However, it is 
not unusual practice to confine nature to two states (for 
41 
instance, Shave11, 1979a, and Arnott and stiglitz, 1988}. 
11. To make the arguments in the text less cumbersome, it is 
assumed that ~!~O vj. 
J 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE PRINCIPAL'S ACTIONS AS AN INCENTIVE DEVICE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
When the principal as well as the agent can choose an 
action influencing the expected outcome, there are circum-
stances in which the principal has at his disposal a new 
mechanism for creating incentives to the agent. Specifically, 
if there is positive interdependence between the actions of the 
players, and the principal perceives that his action can 
influence the agent, then the principal can use his own action 
as an incentive device. 
Many principal-agent examples involve a principal who, 
in practice, is likely to be an active contributor to the 
outcome, rather than a passive observer, whose sole task is to 
specify a compensation scheme. For instance, in the standard 
insurance context (see Spence and Zeckhauser, 1971), the 
expected payout by the insurance company is affected by the 
preventive care taken by the insured. However, the payout is 
also affected by information about accident prevention made 
available by the insurers. Professionals such as doctors and 
lawyers act as agents for clients whose cooperation influences 
the success of their cases. In education the success of 
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students depends not only on their own effort, but also on the 
input from educators. 
The observation that the principal may take an action is 
not new. carmichael (1983) studies the firm-worker 
relationship, in which the firm can influence the level of 
output by actions such as advertizing. Cooper and Ross (1985), 
and Emons (1988) discuss a buyer who faces moral hazard on the 
part of a seller, because the seller chooses an unobservable 
quality level. They note that the buyer's care of the product 
also affects its quality. The focus in these papers is on the 
issue of double moral hazard; that is, the problem that not 
only the principal is confronted with moral hazard, but so is 
the agent, since the principal may shirk (for example, the firm 
may not advertize sufficiently from the point of view of the 
worker; warranties designed to increase the quality chosen by 
the seller induce less care on the part of the buyer). This 
form of double moral hazard is not at issue below. Since, ex 
ante, the agent is always guaranteed his opportunity cost, it 
is arguable that, even when the principal chooses actions which 
cannot be controlled by the agent, the agent is never harmed, 
and so never faces moral hazard. On the other hand, the agent 
may be able to control the principal's action, as well as his 
own. In this sense, the principal may be confronted with 
double moral hazard on the part of the agent. 
1 
A question addressed below is how the principal can 
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motivate the agent to choose proper actions, when the agent 
controls his own action, the action of the principal, or both. 
It is observed that a principal who knows how the agent reacts 
to a contract, will take this information into account when 
choosing his ow~ action. The principal's action therefore has 
incentive effects (indirectly contributing to the outcome) as 
well as a direct effect on the outcome. The existing 
literature observes that the principal's action contributes to 
the outome, but does not discuss its use as an incentive 
device. Carmichael, Cooper and Ross formulate the problem so 
that in the first stage of the game the payments are chosen. 
In the second stage the principal and agent each choose an 
action under Nash conjectures. Thus, each player takes as 
given the other's action, and does not perceive its response to 
his own action. In Emons, there is not enough interdependence 
among actions to generate the incentive effect identified 
below. 
The analysis is organized as follows. section 3.2 
illustrates the issues by way of an example. The model is set 
out in section 3.3. sections 3.4-3.7 characterize the payments 
and actions under various assumptions about which party has 
control over the actions. section 3.8 concludes. 
45 
3.2 AN EXAMPLE 
Consider a firm which hires a consultant to update its 
communications system. The project may succeed or fail. The 
chances that it, will succeed improve with greater effort from 
the consultant, and greater effort (such as cooperation with 
the consultant) from an operator, who is to use the new system. 
Further, greater effort from the operator raises the marginal 
product of the consultant (that is, an extra hour of effort by 
the consultant produces a larger improvement in the network, 
the greater the effort from the operator). Suppose that effort 
generates disutility to the consultant, and that the operator 
must be compensated by the firm for his effort. Then maximum 
effort by the consultant or operator is generally not optimal. 
If the firm has control over the payment made to the 
consultant, at least four possibilities arise depending on who 
controls the actions of the consultant and operator: 
(3.2.1) The firm's expected utility (net of the consultant's 
opportunity cost) is highest if it knows as well as the 
consultant which actions are desirable from its own 
perspective, and if it can observe those actions, so that they 
can be written into a contract. Payment to the consultant will 
entail perfect risk-sharing between the consultant and firm. 
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(3.2.2) If the firm is able to monitor the effort of the 
operator, but not that of the consultant (for example, the 
consultant may have to carry out tasks away from the firm), 
then the firm faces the possibility of shirking by the 
consultant. It, should use the familiar remedy of paying more 
to the consultant, the greater the success of the project. The 
firm can also use the operator to motivate the consultant. By 
specifying a greater level of effort for the operator (in 
return for higher wages) the firm raises the marginal product 
of the consultant, inducing greater effort. Thus, the firm's 
ability to actively influence the outcome of the project 
creates a new incentive mechanism. In addition, the greater 
effort from the operator directly increases the chances of 
success, and so reduces the adverse effect of the consultant's 
shirking. 
(3.2.3) Suppose that the firm is able to monitor the 
consultant's effort (once at the firm, the consultant may 
prefer working to not working, so that the firm need only be 
sure of the consultant's presence), but does not know what 
tasks the operator should perform, leaving the more 
knowledgeable consultant to specify those tasks. Since effort 
by the operator enhances the probability of a successful 
project, yet involves no cost to the consultant, the consultant 
will specify the maximum effort as long as he is paid more when 
the project is successful. If the consultant overworks the 
operator only when that is to his own benefit, the firm can 
solve this form of moral hazard provided the firm is not too 
risk-averse. By paying the consultant a fee that is 
independent of the outcome, the consultant is indifferent to 
the actions of the operator, and is therefore willing to 
specify the tasks most appropriate for the firm. 
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On the other hand, a sufficiently risk-averse firm will 
transfer some risk to the consultant (offer a higher payment 
for a successful project) at the cost of inducing the 
consultant to work the operator as hard as possible. Since any 
exposure of the consultant to risk motivates the consultant in 
this way, the firm chooses the payment scheme which perfectly 
shares risk. 
(3.2.4) Now suppose that the firm in (3.2.3) is also unable to 
monitor the consultant's effort. If the firm bears all of the 
risk associated with the project, the consultant will choose 
minimal effort for himself. To avoid this the firm must pay 
less for an unsuccessful project. Thus, the firm has to trade 
one form of moral hazard (too little effort by the consultant) 
against another (too much effort specified by the consultant 
for the operator). If the consultant and operator are 
sufficiently productive, the firm will expose the consultant to 
some risk to elicit above minimal effort, at the cost of having 
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to provide high compensation to the operator for carrying out 
the tasks specified by the consultant. 
3.3 THE MODEL 
Consider the models in (1.2.2) and (1.2.4) with the 
number of states limited to two. Let ~ denote the probability 
that the favorable state (2) occurs, and suppose that this 
probability is affected by the actions, BE[B,B), of the 
principal, as well as by the actions, aE[£,a], of the agent; 
that is, ~=~(a,B). It is assumed that ~(a,~)=~(£,B)=O, ~a>o, 
B aa BB aB ~ >0, ~ <0, ~ <0, and ~ >0. In words, if the actions are 
levels of effort, a necessary condition for a favorable outcome 
is that minimal effort be avoided; greater effort from either 
agent or principal increases the probability of the favorable 
state, but at a diminishing rate; and greater effort from the 
principal raises the marginal product of the agent (that is, 
the actions are complements). 
Both players dislike effort - the marginal disutility 
from effort is v for the principal, and u for the agent (v and 
u are assumed constant). If the state-independent utility 
functions over the outcome are V for the principal and U for 
the agent, then the expected utilities are 
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for the principal, and 
for the agent. It is assumed that U and V are monotone 
increasing, that U is strictly concave, and that V is concave. 
The variables which are controlled by the principal are 
written into a contract before the variables under the control 
of the agent are chosen by the agent. The principal always 
controls the terms of compensation, but not necessarily the 
actions. All choices are made before an outcome is realized. 
To induce the agent to accept a contract the principal 
guarantees that the contract generates the agent's reservation 
expected utility level: 
(3.3.1) EU ~ U 
The principal may face further incentive-compatibility 
constraints depending on the agent's ability to control the 
actions. If the agent effectively controls his own action (for 
instance, because it is unobservable to the principal), then 
his action satisfies the usual condition for expected utility 
maximization: 
(3.3.2) aEargmax EU(c1 ,c2,a' ,B) a' 
where the arguments of EU have been written explicitly. 
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Similarly, if the agent controls the principal's action, 
then the latter must satisfy: 
(3.3.3) 
The problems described in section 3.2 can now be stated 
formally. Since the agent's expected utility is guaranteed, 
the first-best situation is attained when the principal can 
effectively control both actions, so that the terms of 
compensation as well as the actions can be written into a 
contract. This case is described in (3.2.1). The optimum, 
A A A A 
denoted (c
1
,c
2
,a,B), is the solution to 
(3.3.4) Max EV s.t. (3.3.1) 
c 1 c 2 a B 
The example in (3.2.2) allows the principal to write a 
contract specifying the terms of compensation and his own 
action, but not the agent's action. The agent then chooses an 
* * * * action satisfying (3.3.2). The optimum (c 1 ,c2 ,a,B) is 
therefore the solution to 
(3.3.5)2 Max EV s.t. (3 . 3 . 1 ) and (3. 3 . 2 ) 
c 1 c 2 a B 
In this form the model bears resemblance to the double 
moral hazard models discussed in section 3.1. However, whereas 
(3.3.5) allows the principal to take into account the agent's 
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reactions to changes in B (via (3.3.2)), Carmichael, and Cooper 
and Ross assume that all actions are chosen after the payments 
have been specified (in the second stage of the game), taking 
as given the actions (but not reactions) of the other(s). 
While (3.3.5) is like Emons' formulation, he assumes away the 
direct interdependence of the actions. 
The nature of the relationship may be such that the 
agent controls the principal's action, but not his own. In 
this case, the principal chooses the compensation scheme and 
action of the agent, given the reactions of the agent, who 
chooses the principal's action after accepting a contract. 
Those reactions are captured by the incentive-compatibility 
constraint (3.3.3). The optimum (C1,C2,~,B) is the solution to 
(3.3.6) Max EV s.t. (3.3.1) and (3.3.3) 
c 1 c 2 a B 
The problems in (3.3.5) and (3.3.6) are second-best in 
the sense that, ex ante, the agent is indifferent among the 
A A A A * * * * _ _ __ 
situations (c
1
,c
2
,a,B), (c 1 ,c2 ,a,B) and (c1 ,c2 ,a,B), while the 
principal generally prefers the first to either of the other 
two. Thus, the principal can face moral hazard because the 
agent's effort cannot be contracted upon, or because the agent 
is able to control the action of the principal. 
A third-best situation allows the agent to choose both 
actions, exposing the principal to both kinds of moral hazard. 
The principal then chooses the compensation scheme, again 
taking as given the reactions of the agent. This third-best 
000 
(3.3.7) Max EV s.t. ( 3 . 3 . 1) (3. 3 • 2) and ( 3 . 3 . 3 ) 
c 1 c 2 0:,13 
The following sections characterize the solutions to 
3 
problems (3.3.4)-(3.3.7). 
3.4 CHARACTERIZATION OF CONTRACTS WHEN THE PRINCIPAL 
CONTROLS BOTH ACTIONS (Problem (3.3.4)) 
Proposition 1 
When the principal controls the compensation scheme and both 
52 
A A A A 4 
actions, an interior optimum (c1 ,c2 ,0:,13) is characterized by: 
(3.4.1) = 
Ao: A Ao: A 
(3.4.2) 7r flV 7r flU-U = 
A13 A 
7r flV-v 
A13 A 
7r flU 
Ao: A Ao: A 
(3.4.3) 7r flV = 7r flU-U i=1,2 
A A 
V' (w. -c. ) 
]. ]. 
u' (c i ) 
Proof: Let a denote the multiplier associated with constraint 
(3.3.1). An interior solution satisfies: 5 
A A A 
(3.4.4) -V'(i) + aU' (i) = 0 i=1,2 
(3.4.5) 
1'.0: A 
+ 
A 1'.0: A 
u) 0 '1\" t:,.V a('1\" t:,.U - = 
(3.4.6) 
AB A 
V + 
AAB A 
0 '1\" t:,.V - a'1\" t:,.U = 
A 
(3.4.7) EU - U = 0 
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Proposition 1 follows from a rearrangement of (3.4.4)-(3.4.6) .• 
A A A A 
The contract (c
1
,c
2
,0:,B) can be derived from (3.4.1)-
(3 • 4 • 3 ) and (3. 4 • 7) • 
(3.4.8) 
A 
V' (w.-c.) ~ ~ 
(3.4.2) and (3.4.3) imply 
= i=1,2 
Let the outcome be thought of as income. Then (3.4.1)-(3.4.3) 
and (3.4.8) state that the marginal rate of sUbstitution 
between, respectively, income in the two states, the two 
actions, and either action and income in either state, are 
equal for the principal and agent. Condition (3.4.1) is well-
known, and means that the principal and agent perfectly share 
the risks associated with the outcome (Borch, 1962). 
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3.5 CHARACTERIZATION OF CONTRACTS WHEN THE PRINCIPAL IS 
UNABLE TO CONTROL THE AGENT'S ACTION (Problem (3.3.5)) 
proposition 2 
When the principal controls the compensation scheme and his own 
action, and the agent's action is under the control of the 
* * * * agent, an interior optimum (c
l
,c
2
,a,B) is characterized by: 
(3.5.1) 
(3.5.2) 
*a * *a {J 
7f I1V > - 7f 11 -u 0 = 
*B * 
7f I1V-v *8 {J 7f 11 
(3.5.3) 
*B {J 
7f 11 -v > 
*8 {J 7f 11 
* V' (wl-c l ) U' (~l) 
(3.5.4) 
*8 {J *8 {J a8 a 7f 11 -v > 7f 11 iff 7f > 7f 
* * B V' (w2-c2) u' (c2) 7f 7f 
Proof: Given that 7f is strictly concave in a, and that ~ is 
suboptimal,6 (3.3.2) may be replaced by the first-order 
condition with respect to a of EU: 
7 
(3.5.5) 
Let p denote the multiplier associated with (3.5.5). An 
interior solution to problem (3.3.5) must satisfy:5 
(3.5.6) 
(3.5.7) 
(3.5.8) 
(3.5.9) 
(3.5.10) 
i=1,2 11".= {1-1I" ~ 11" 
*B * **B * **aB * 
11" ~v - v + 011" ~U + ~11" ~U = 0 
* EU - U = 0 
*a :k 
11" ~u - U = 0 
if i=l 
if i=2 
substituting (3.5.10) into (3.5.7) and rearranging gives 
(3.5.11) * ~ = 
substituting (3.5.11) into (3.5.8) and rearranging gives 
(3.5.12) * o = ~B~~ _ v _ ~a[~aB/~aa]~~ 
~B~{j 
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substituting (3.5.11) and (3.5.12) into (3.5.6) and rearranging 
gives 
(3.5.13) 
~B~~ _ v _ ~a[~aB/~aaJ~~ 
~B~{} 
i=1,2 
* * * * C l ' c 2 ' a and B are determined by (3.5.9), (3.5.10) and 
(3.5.13) . 
It is well-known that (3.5.13) implies (3.5.1), and 
* * 6U, ~v > 0 (see, for instance, Grossman and Hart, 1983). 
*B * *a * Hence, IT ~V-v < 0 (using (3.5.8)) and IT ~V > O. This with 
(3.5.10) gives (3.5.2). 
(3.5.13) with i=l gives 
and hence (3.5.3). 
*B * 
IT 6U 
(3.5.13) with i=2 gives (3.5,4). • 
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Condition (3.5.1) is a familiar result and implies that 
* * c l <c2 ' That is, the principal gives a reward when the outcome 
is high in order to motivate the agent. 
since the agent's effort at the margin is of no value to 
the agent himself (his private marginal cost and benefit from 
the action are equal), the principal's marginal rate of 
substituting the agent's action for his own exceeds the agent's 
marginal rate of substitution between the actions. This is 
condition (3,5.2). 
The model contains a new incentive mechanism, namely, an 
increase in the principal's action, which raises the agent's 
marginal product (ITa) thus motivating higher effort by the 
agent (as well as directly increasing IT). This incentive 
effect is reflected in the term ITQB in (3.5.13). Since the 
principal takes into account the incentive effect of his own 
action, and the disincentive effect of a higher payment in 
state 1, while ~he agent does not, the principal places a 
higher value (at the margin) on his own action in terms of 
income in state 1, than does the agent. This is stated in 
(3.5.3) • 
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The same need not hold when the valuation is in terms of 
income in state 2, because higher payments in state 2 motivate 
the agent. However, if the incentive effect of the principal's 
effort is stronger than the incentive effect of the state 2 
QB B Q 8 payment (more precisely, if IT lIT >IT lIT), then in terms of 
income in state 2, the principal values his own action more 
highly than does the agent. The converse also holds. This 
explains (3.5.4). 
3~6 CHARACTERIZATION OF CONTRACTS WHEN THE PRINCIPAL IS 
UNABLE TO CONTROL HIS OWN ACTION (Problem (3.3.6)) 
In problems (3.3.4) and (3.3.5) an interior solution for 
all variables is a plausible assumption. specifically, an 
increase in c
l
' c
2
' Q or B imposes a cost upon the principal 
(an increase in Q imposes an indirect cost, since the agent 
must be compensated by an increase in the expected payment) . 
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It therefore seems reasonable that the optimum does not set 
these variables at their upper bounds. Likewise, if a=O or 
B=O, then ~=O, so that the worst outcome is certain. Hence, a 
and B will not be set at their lower bounds. Further, since 
the agent is risk-averse, cl=O or c
2
=0 is not optimal. 
In contrast, in problem (3.3.6) it is very likely that 
-either B or ~ will be chosen. Since an increase in B benefits, 
but does not involve a cost to the agent, a higher payment in 
state 2 induces the agent to dictate the maximum effort B to 
the principal. conversely, a lower payment in state 2 induces 
the agent to choose~. It is assumed that the principal wishes 
to avoid ~, and must therefore set the terms of compensation so 
that ~U~O. 
In view of these comments and the strict concavity of n 
in B, the constraint in (3.3.3) may be replaced by 
9 (3.6.1) if > then B=B 
if = then BE(~,B) 
In addition to assuming away the possibility that ~ will 
be chosen, it is assumed that, given any contract which meets 
the agent's reservation expected utility, a choice of B by the 
agent is not the principal's most preferred choice; that is, 
given payments and actions satisfying the agent's participation 
constraint EU(c
1
,c
2
,a,B)=U, the principal prefers a lower value 
of B. This seems a reasonable assumption, because if B were 
59 
optimal, then the principal and agent would not be in conflict 
over the value of B, so that the problem would not be of much 
interest. This is expressed formally in (3.6.10) below. 
In choosing the optimal contract, the principal may 
choose to bear all of the risk (C
l
=C
2
), in which case the agent 
(but not the principal) is indifferent to the value of B, and 
is willing to choose the value that is optimal for the 
principal. Alternatively, the principal shifts some of the 
risk to the agent (C
l
<C
2
), but thereby induces the agent to 
specify the costliest action B. The outcome depends on the 
nature of the principal's utility function. The results below 
are confined to the class of utility functions V, which have a 
constant coefficient of absolute risk aversion; that is, 
r=-V" (·)/V' (.) is a constant. 
Lemma 1 identifies a utility function for the principal, 
such that the (constrained) optimum is characterized by the 
costliest action B: 
Lemma I 
Let the principal control the compensation scheme and the 
agent's action, and let the agent control the principal's 
action. Let the optimum be denoted (c
l
,c2 ,a,B). Then there 
exists rl>o and vl>o, such that B=B. 
Proof: Given r1>0, let v=o. Then B=B. By continuity of v, 
given r=r
1
, 3V
1
>0, such that B=B. • 
-
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Although] the principal may be better off if B<B (other 
things equal), the cost of inducing the agent to choose.B<B is 
too high when r=r1 and v=v1 
(that is, the cost of bearing all 
of the risk is high relative to the cost of implementing 
-B) • 
Proposition 3 describes the solution to (3.3.6) for a 
risk-neutral principal, and for a sufficiently risk-averse 
principal, given that the principal, other things equal, 
- -prefers B<B to B=B: 
Proposition 3 
Let the principal control the compensation scheme and the 
agent's action, and let the agent control the principal's 
action. Assume that the optimum is interior for c l ' c 2 ' and a, 
and that ~ is never optimal. Further, if L is the Lagrangean 
-B - -of (3.3.6), assume that L (c ,c ,a,B)<O V(c ,c2 ,a,B) satisfying 1 2 1 
(3.3.1). 
(a) If r=O (the principal is risk-neutral), then 
(0 ,e ,~,B) is characterized by 
1 2 
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(3.6.2) 
(3.6.3) 
-B ... 7r t:,.V-v = 
-B .... 7r·t:,.U = 0 
(3.6.4) u i=1,2 where k=V' (.) 
(b) Let r=r1 and v=v1 (as defined in Lemma 1). Then 
(3.6.5) = --------- ------
(3.6.6) 
-8 - -B -7r t:,.V-v > _ 7r t:,.U 
-0: - -0: -
(3.6.7) 7r /J.V = 7r t:,.U-u i=1,2 
V' (wi-C i ) U'(Ci ) 
Proof: Let "{ denote the multiplier associated with (3.6.1) • A 
solution to problem (3.3.6), replacing (3.3.3) with (3.6.1) 
, , 5 sat~sf~es 
(3.6.8) i=1,2 
(3.6.9) -Q - - -Q - --Ba -7r t:,.V + ~(7r t:,.U - u) + "{7r t:,.U = 0 
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-B - ~-B - --BB - -(3.6.10) n ~V - V + an ~u + 7n ~u ~ 0 < if B=B 
(by the assumption in the proposition) 
(3.6.11) EU - U = 0 
(3.6.12) ;B~U ~ 0 if > then B=B and ~=O 
A _ A A A A 
(a) Let r=O. Let ci=ci i=1,2, and a=a (where c l
' c2 ' and a are 
part of the solution to problem (3.3.4) in which the principal 
controls all the variables). 
A A 
It is well-known that if VIis constant (3.4.1) implies c
l
=c
2
' 
- B - A so that ~U=O. Hence, n ~U=O VB. In particular, B satisfies 
B - A A A A 
n ~U=O, so that, given (c
1
,c
2
,a), B is incentive-compatible. 
Thus, when r=o, the solution to (3.3.6) is the first-best 
solution. Proposition 3a then follows from Proposition 1 with 
A 
~U=O and V' (.)sk. 
-(b) By Lemma 1, B=B. If ~U~O, then the agent chooses B<B, 
- -which gives a contradiction. Hence, ~U>O, so that 7=0 by 
-(3.6.12). Substituting 7 into (3.6.8), (3.6.9) and (3.6.10) 
(for which the inequality applies) and rearranging gives 
(3.6.5)-(3.6.7). • 
If the principal is risk-neutral, the optimal payments 
and actions are determined by (3.6.2), (3.6.3), (3.6.4) and 
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(3.6.11). The first-best outcome can be achieved by shielding 
the agent from all risk. A fixed payment given by (3.6.2) 
makes the agent indifferent to the principal's action, so that 
the principal can effectively choose his own action (that is, 
A A A A 
having specifie~ c
1
, c
2 
and a in the contract, 8 is incentive-
compatible) . 
At an optimum neither party is affected by marginal 
changes in the principal's action, the agent being indifferent 
to that action, and the principal having equated the marginal 
benefit (~8~V) with the marginal cost (v) of his action. Thus, 
the marginal rates of substituting the agent's for the 
principal's action is zero for both principal and agent 
(condition (3.6.3)). 
The result suggests (although this is not proven), that 
when the gains from risk-sharing are small relative to the cost 
of 8 (r is relatively small), it is optimal to sacrifice all 
risk-sharing opportunities to avoid moral hazard (a choice of 
8) by the agent. 
When the gains from risk-sharing are large relative to 
the cost of 8, the optimal payments and actions are determined 
by (3.6.5), (3.6.7), (3.6.11) and 8=8. In this case, the 
principal shifts some of the risk to the agent. But, as soon 
as the agent bears any risk, he dictates the costliest action 
to the principal. Given that the principal controls the 
agent's action, the compensation scheme generates no 
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-(dis)incentives other than motivating B when c
1
<c
2
• Thus, 
having decided to share some risk its is optimal to share risk 
perfectly. 
It seems possible that, if the principal wants to share 
risks, and hence accepts B, he will require a greater than 
first-best effort from the agent. specifically, if the 
principal takes as given B=B, then the problem amounts to 
(3.3.4) with B=B replacing (3.4.6). Suppose, initially, that 
the principal controls B, and hence specifies the first-best 
A 
contract. Then (3.4.4)-(3.4.7) are satisfied. Now replace B 
A 
with B. If L is the Lagrangean of (3.3.4), then 
AC A A _ A 
L i(C.,a,B,a)=O from (3.4.4) (no direct effect on the 
~ 
Aa A A _ A 
compensation scheme), L (c.,a,B,a»O from (3.4.5), and 
~ 
Aa A A _ A 
L (c.,a,B,a»O from (3.4.7). This suggests that the principal, 
~ 
when losing control over his own action, adjusts the agent's 
action upwards, meeting the agent's reservation expected 
utility by adjusting the payments. 
3.7 CHARACTERIZATION OF CONTRACTS WHEN THE AGENT CONTROLS 
BOTH ACTIONS (Problem (3.3.7)) 
If the principal offers a fixed payment (to make all 
values of B incentive-compatible), then the agent will choose 
a=£, and so guarantee the unfavorable outcome. To avoid this 
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possibility the agent must be paid more in the favorable state. 
This induces the agent to dictate 13 to the principal. The 
characterization of the optimal compensation then follows 
directly from existing results, since the problem reduces to 
the model in (3~3.5); that is, there is imperfect risk-sharing 
to motivate a higher effort on the part of the agent. Further, 
at the optimum, the actions do not satisfy the efficiency 
condition (3.4.2). These observations are summarized in 
Proposition 4 
Let the principal control the compensation scheme, and let the 
agent control both actions. Assume that the optimum 
o 000 
(c
1
,c
2
,a,13) is interior 
o 
Further, if L 
for c,c and a and that 13 is never 
12-
is the Lagrangean of (3.3.7), assume 
o 0 0 0 
optimal. 
013 
that L <0 V(c
1
,c
2
,a,13) satisfying (3.3.1). Then (c1 ,c2 ,a,13) is 
characterized by 
(3.7.1) 
(3.7.2) 
(3.7.3) 
o 
VI(W-C) 2 2 
;aLlV 
013 0 
'1f LlV-v 
013 0 
'1f LlV-V 
0 
> 
VI (w1-c1 ) 
o a 0 
- '1f LlV-U = 0 
013 0 
'1f LlV 
013 0 
> '1f LlV 
0 
VI (c1) 
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°B ° ° B ° aB a 
(3.7.4) 11' /::"V-v > 11' /::,.U if, given B=B 11' ~ 11' 
° ° a V' (w -c ) U' (c2) 11' 11' 2 2 
o 0 0 0 
Proof: A solution (c1 ,c2 ,a,B) to (3.3.7) (replacing (3.3.3) 
with (3.6.1)) satisfies5 
(3.7.5) i=1,2 
(3.7.6) 
(3.7.7) < if B=B 
(by the assumption in the proposition) • 
° (3.7.8) EU - U = 0 
(3.7.9) °a ° 11' /::,.U - U == 0 
(3.7.10) °B ° 11' /::,.U ~ 0 
0_0 
if > then B=B and 1=0 
o 0 _ 0 
To avoid a=~ the principal sets /::,.U>O, so that B=B and 1=0. 
substituting 1 and (3.7.9) into (3.7.6) gives 
(3.7.11) p, = 
°a ° 
11' /::,.V 
o ° 
1I'aa/::,.U 
substituting 1 and (3.7.11) into (3.7.5) gives 
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o 0 
( V'(2) _V'(l) __ 3.7.12) 
o o 
U' (2) U' (1) 
o 
c 1 , c 2 , ex and B are determined by (3.7.8), (3.7.9), (3.7.12) o _ 
and B=B. 
(3.7.12) implies (3.7.1). Hence ~V, ~U>O, so that with ~=O, 
° B o. 
(3.7.7) implies n ~V-v < O. This with (3.7.9) gives (3.7.2). 
° 
Substituting ~ and (3.7.11) into (3.7.7) gives 
(3.7.13) 
Substituting (3.7.11) and (3.7.13) into (3.7.5) and rearranging 
gives 
(3.7.14) 
o 
U' (i) 
° B 0 
n ~U 
i=1,2 
o BOO 
(3.7.14) with i=l gives - n ~V-v > VI (1) and hence (3.7.3). 
° B ° 
n ~U 
(3.7.14) with i=2 gives (3.7.4). 
o 
U' (1) 
For reasons discussed in section 3.5 (which differs from 
this section in that here the agent controls B), at the optimum 
there is imperfect risk-sharing, and the agent's marginal rate 
of substituting his own for the principal's action is lower 
than that for the principal. 
The principal's effort is higher than optimal, being 
chosen by the agent who does not considers its cost. This is 
reflected in the discrepencies between the marginal rates of 
substituting effort for income in (3.7.3) and (3.7.4). 
However, some of the discrepancy is desired by the principal, 
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because higher effort by himself motivates the agent. This is 
the incentive effect discussed in section 3.5. 
It seems possible that the agent will choose higher 
effort for himself when he also controls the principal's 
0*_ 
action, than otherwise (that is, a>a may hold). If B=B, the 
principal's problem reduces to problem (3.3.5), replacing 
(3.5.8) with B=B. The higher effort by the principal makes the 
agent's effort more productive at the margin. This induces the 
agent to choose higher effort. It also motivates the 
principal, who captures some of the increase in the agent's 
productivity, to provide a further inducement by shifting more 
risk to the agent. 
Consider, for instance, a risk-neutral principal with 
V' (·)=k. Rearranging (3.5.6) and using (3.5.11) gives 
(3.7.15) 
If 1('~~, 
k k = (
*a)2 * 1(' t,V 
* - a then replacing B with B causes 1(' to increase and 
(1-1(')1(' to fall, in which case the increase in B directly raises 
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the right-hand side of (3.7.15). To maintain the equality, 
c
2
-cl must increase, motivating an increase in Q. While this 
argument ignores the feedback effects from changes in the other 
first-order conditions, it suggests that there are forces which 
make it optimal, for the principal to shift more risk to the 
agent, and for the agent to choose a closer to first-best 
effort. 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
A small literature treats the principal as an active 
rather than passive player in the principal-agent relationship. 
It observes that if the principal's actions are productive, 
then the principal as well as the agent may be a source of 
moral hazard, requiring a way of simultaneously attacking moral 
hazard on the part of both players. 
The analysis above looks at a different kind of double 
moral hazard, namely on the part of the agent, who may himself 
shirk, or may be in a position to impose undesirable actions 
upon the principal. Under various assumptions about the 
ability of the players to control actions (but always allowing 
the principal to control the compensation scheme), optimal 
contracts are described in terms of their risk-sharing 
properties and the nature of the actions. 
When there is no moral hazard the payments and actions 
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are chosen, so that at an optimum, the marginal rates of 
sUbstitution between ihcome across states, actions, or between 
actions and income in either state, respectively, are equal for 
the principal and agent. 
When the agent is able to shirk, but cannot control the 
principal's action, some exposure to risk by the agent is 
optimal (for the well-known reason that it motivates a higher 
effort by the agent). Further, the principal can motivate the 
agent (as well as sUbstitute for the agent's action) by 
adjusting his own action. 
If the agent controls the principal's, but not his own 
action, then a risk-neutral principal makes a fixed payment to 
the agent, and, because the agent is indifferent to both 
actions, stipulates a first-best mix of actions. A 
sufficiently risk-averse principal chooses perfect risk-
sharing, carries out the maximum effort, and may stipulate a 
higher than first-best effort for the agent. 
If the agent controls both actions, the contract 
involves imperfect risk-sharing, maximum effort by the 
principal, while the agent's effort may be closer to being 
first-best than the level he chooses when the principal's 
action is not under his control. 
3.9 NOTES 
1. For instance, workers (by way of unions) might be able 
to enforce excessive levels of safety in firms; lawyers may 
advise clients ~o carry out actions, which given greater 
knowledge of the law, the client would not have carried out; 
and conditions in warranties may lead the buyer to take more 
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care than if he had fully understood the nature of product. In 
addition, the worker and the lawyer have an incentive to shirk, 
and the seller has an incentive to produce a good of low 
quality. 
2. See section 1.2 and note 8 in Chapter 1 for a discussion 
of Q as a variable under the maximization sign, when the agent 
controls the value of Q. 
3. Problems (3.3.6) and (3.3.7) are considered in chapter 5 
in a similar context. In this model the graduation rate 
depends on student effort Q (controlled by the government or by 
students), and the level of education B (controlled by 
students) . 
4. Notation is as follows: 
A A 
fsf(·) (likewise for symbols other than A) 
V(i)=V(w.-c.) 
~ ~ 
U(i)=U(c.) 
~ 
f' is the derivative of f 
~V=V(2)-V(1) ~U=U(2)-U(1) 
fX is the partial derivative of f with respect to x 
5. It is assumed that the Hessian matrix of this problem is 
negative semi-definite, so that the conditions are also 
sufficient for a (local) maximum. 
6. If a is optimal, then n(~,B)=O is optimal, and the 
principal would not hire the agent. 
7. If ~U~O,.then a=a. Hence ~U>O. The second-order 
condition for maximum expected utility of the agent - namely 
*aa * * n ~U<o - is therefore satisfied, and a maximizes 
* * * EU(c
1
,c
2
,a,B). This is a special case of the first-order 
approach described in Rogerson (1985). 
8. The effect of an increase in B is to raise a n , and 
induce higher effort from the agent. 
the incentive effect of B. 
aBI B . f n n 1S a measure 0 
The effect of an increase in c
2 
is to raise 
EU
a
=n
a
(U(c
2
)-U(C
1
), which induces higher effort by the agent. 
a 
n In is a measure of the incentive effect of c2~ 
9. The second-order condition for an expected utility 
BB 
maximum of the agent is n ~U<o. 
It is argued below that if ~U=O, any value of B maximizes the 
agent's expected utility. If ~U>O, then the second-order 
condition is satisfied, so that B again maximizes the agent's 
expected utility. 
72 
73 
CHAPTER 4 
THE CORE OF AN. ECONOMY WITH MORAL HAZARD 
4.1 INTRODUCrION 
Edgeworth (1881), and Debreu and Scarf (1963) identified 
the allocations that survive the bargaining process in a 
private goods economy. Since then Shapley and Shubik (1969), 
Foley (1970), Richter (1974), Wooders (1978, 1981), and Telser 
(1982), among others, have extended the theory to economies 
with public goods. They observe that, in the presence of 
public goods, coalitions of agents may not be able to make 
themselves completely independent from the rest of society. A 
theory of the core, therefore, requires a statement about the 
reaction of noncoalition agents to the formation of a 
coalition. 
A question addressed below is whether the result, that 
(under certain conditions) the core of a sufficiently large 
private goods economy approximates a competitive allocation, 
also holds for an economy with public goods. The existing 
literature does not appear to resolve the issue. It is 
investigated below in the context of a moral hazard model. Ln 
this model agents receive a state-dependent endowment of a 
private good. There is a common probability distribution over 
the states, which depends on actions by the agents. Better 
actions shift the distribution towards more favorable states. 
since the action of any agent enters the expected utility of 
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all agents, and since noone can be prevented from its benefits, 
each action has the properties of a public good. The problem 
is to determine which allocations of the private good and which 
actions are in the core, whether a core exists, and how the 
core is affected as the economy grows. 
The model may be seen as a generalization of the 
principal-agent models of Ross (1973), Holmstrom (1979, 1982) 
and others. The possibility of moral hazard arises if 
coalition agents choose actions without regard to noncoalition 
agents, so that their actions are likely to be socially 
suboptimal. The model can be derived from standard principal-
agent models by allowing the principal, as well as the agent, 
to choose an action, and by allowing the agent to take part in 
d t " h' t' 1 e ermlnlng lS own compensa 10n. 
The model may also be seen as a variation of a class of 
models developed by, among others, Hurwicz (1972), Townsend 
(1979), Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), and Palfrey and 
srivastava (1986, 1989). These authors extend the Arrow-Debreu 
model of general equilibrium to situations where agents must be 
induced to reveal truthful information about a private 
characteristic such as preferences or endowments. In the 
generalized moral hazard model agents must be induced to choose 
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desirable actions. However, this variation creates a 
difference that is fundamental in an analysis of the core. In 
the models cited above, the welfare of a coalition of agents 
does not depend on the messages sent by noncoalition agents, 
because messages are of relevance only if commodity exchange 
takes place between senders and recipients. In contrast, in 
the moral hazard model, a coalition's welfare depends on 
actions by noncoalition agents, even if there is no commodity 
exchange between these groups. 
The analysis is organized as follows. section 4.2 gives 
an example. The problem is formalized in section 4.3, and 
diagrammatically illustrated in section 4.4 for an economy with 
two agents. section 4.5 discusses Pareto optimality, and a 
definition of the core is given in section 4.6. The Pareto 
optimality of contracts in the core is established in section 
4.7, while section 4.8 discusses individually rational 
contracts, and characterizes the core of an economy with one 
pair of agents. section 4.9 extends the characterization to 
economies with r pairs of agents. Existence of the core is 
proven in section 4.10. Section 4.11 concludes. 
4.2 AN EXAMPLE 
Consider a group of farmers, each with his own orchard. 
In each orchard the apple yield is either high or low, 
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depending on whether or not growing conditions turn out to be 
favorable. One of the factors influencing growing conditions, 
and hence, the expected yield, is the incidence of disease. If 
disease breaks out in any orchard, it spreads to all other 
orchards, thereby lowering the probability that the yield will 
be high. To avoid disease all farmers must spray their 
orchards. Each farmer prefers that his neighbors spray, but 
because spraying is costly, he has an incentive to not spray 
his own trees. 
The farmers write a contract stipulating an exchange of 
apples across states of nature in order to spread the risk 
associated with production, and specifying whether or not 
spraying is required. The incentive to sign a contract which 
requires spraying depends upon the associated risk-sharing 
arrangement. Suppose, for instance, that there are two 
farmers, one of whom agrees to give up apples if a low yield is 
realized, in exchange for apples if a high yield is realized. 
Exchange makes the low yield state more costly to that farmer, 
so that he has a greater incentive to spray his orchard. In 
contrast, the other farmer has less incentive to spray his 
orchard. 
Under these circumstances what conditions (regarding 
preferences, technology, behavior, etc.) guarantee that the 
farmers collectively will agree on a contract which spreads the 
risks associated with the yield and requires every farmer to 
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spray his orchard? Further, what are the properties of such an 
agreement - is it efficient; does it discriminate among 
identical farmers, does it bear any relation to contracts 
traded in a competitive market? 
In the above example a key feature is that disease can 
be avoided only if each orchard is sprayed. ~his feature also 
applies to problems such as the building of a dike, when more 
than one team of workers is involved. Shirking by one team, 
causing the dike to break at a single place, has the same 
effect as shirking by several teams, causing the dike to break 
at several places. Similarly, classified information held by a 
group of people can be leaked as effectively by a single member 
as by all members. 
The following section describes the formal model. 
4.3 THE MODEL 
Consider the economy 
hi} {Vhi} ] {A , n , hi€~ hi€~ 
~ is a set of 2r agents, with r agents of each of two 
types. Agent hi is the ith agent of the hth type, and has a 
hi hi hi 
state-dependent endowment of a private good w =(wl ,w2 ), 
h hi, h' d t f th d 'f t t' urs were w, 1S 1S en owmen 0 e goo 1 s a e J occ . 
J 
without loss of generality it is assumed that state 2 is the 
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favorable state: 
Assumption 1 
hi hi 
wI < W2 Vhi€~. 
X~i is the set of allocations x~i 
hi if st~te j occurs. Let xhi=(Xhi,Xhl) 
1 2 
of the good to agent 
hi hi hi 
and let x =(x
1 
,x
2 
) 
h' hi 
denote a member of X ~ (thus, x is agent hils ex ante 
allocation of the good) . 
Ahi is the set of actions 
hi 
of agent hi, and is a 
restricted to two possibilities: hi - Actions A ={Q.,a}, Q.<a. may 
be interpreted as levels of effort, and are assumed observable. 
2 
The probability that state 2 occurs is a function of 
the effort of each agent, namely, n:IT Ahi ~ (0,1), where 
K, 
IT =IT
h
, denotes the product over all hi belonging to~. It is 
~ ~€~ 
assumed that the value of n is determined by the smallest of 
all effort levels, and that effort is productive in the sense 
that a greater minimum effort raises the probability of a large 
endowment: 
Assumption 2 
11 2r ,11 2r 
n(a , ... ,a )=n(m~n{a , ... ,a }) 
- -
={1L,n}, 1L<n. 
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V
hi 
is agent hi's state-independent utility function 
over the good and agent hi's action, and is assumed separable. 
Specifically, vhi ; (X~i,Ahi) ~ R (where R is the set of non-
J 
t ' 1 b ) d Vhi ( hi hi)=uhi ( hi) hi h nega 1ve rea n~m ers , an x"Q - x, - Q , were 
J J 
Assumption 3 
hi, d' t' " , U 1S 1fferen 1able, monotone 1ncreas1ng, and str1ctly 
concave 'v'hieK:. 
Notation involving subsets of agents is as follows. e 
denotes the set of non-empty subsets of K:, and a member of e (a 
coalition) is denoted O. Let sO=n xhi x n Ahi denote the set 
o K: 
of strategies s =(x ,Q ), where xn denotes the vector of ex o 0 K: {} 
ante allocations for all members of 0, and Q denotes a vector 
K: -of actions for all members of K:. Let Q and Q denote the 2r--K: K: 
- -vectors (~, ... ,~) and (Q, ... ,Q). -0 (the complementary 
coalition) is the complement of 0 in K:. 
A A A A 0 A 
For each s =(x ,Q ,Q n)eS , r/s n is the game induced on o 0 0 -0· 0 
A 
subgroup -0 by the choice So of coalition O. In full 
, 7r ' {V
hi
} ] ' hie-o 
where 7r':n_
o 
Ahi ~ (0,1) is given by 7r'(Q_o)=7r(~o,a_o)' 
Before the state occurs, agents have the following 
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information. Each agent knows the state-dependent endowment, 
the form of the probability function, and utility functions. 
Given this information, the agents sign a contract stipulating 
3 an allocation of the good and an action for each agent. The 
allocation is epsentially a risk-sharing arrangement. 
hi Agent hi's ex ante evaluation of an allocation x and a 
set of actions a is 
K, 
a 
hi 
The problem is to identify the allocations and actions, 
which the group might collectively agree upon, and which might 
therefore be observed as written contracts. 4 
Like the models of Hurwicz, Townsend, etc., this model 
is an extension of the Arrow-Debreu commodity exchange model 
with uncertainty. Unlike those models, interaction among 
agents involves more than the exchange of a private good based 
on messages about private characteristics; even in the absence 
of exchange, agents interact because the action of each agent 
may affect the welfare of every other agent. More 
hi 
specifically, agent hi's action a enters the expected utility 
function of all agents, and no agent can be prevented from 
, 't hi th t th' t' 2 "consumJ.ng" the quantJ. y a ,so a J.S economy con aJ.ns r 
public goods (the actions) as well as a private good. 
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4.4 DIAGRAMMATIC ILLUSTRATION 
Consider an economy with one agent of each type. Agent 
h1, h=1,2, has convex indifference curves over the good in the 
. 11 21 
two states, par~meter~zed by the actions (a ,a ). Given a 
set of actions, higher indifference curves imply higher 
expected utility levels. 
. 11 21 
A greater value of m~n{a ,a } (and 
hence a greater value of ~) raises the expected utility from 
the second state relative to the expected utility from the 
first state, and thus flattens the indifference curve through a 
-h1 
given bundle x (see Figure 4.14.1 in section 4.14). Since 
there are four different pairs of actions, there are four 
-h1 - -indifference curves through x ,but, since ~(~,~)=~(~,a)=~(a 
,~) three of these indifference curves coincide with the 
steeper curve, differing only in the levels of expected utility 
associated with them. 
Figure 4.14.2 shows an Edgeworth box with an endowment 
point w, and consumption of the good in each state, measured in 
the indicated directions. It shows the indifference curves of 
both agents through the endowment point. without loss of 
generality, it is assumed that risk-sharing involves the type 2 
agent giving up some of the good if state 1 occurs, in exchange 
for receiving more of the good if state 2 occurs; thus, 
11 11 21 21 hi hi . 
MRS (w ,a »MRS (w ,a), where MRS (x ,a) ~s agent hils 
~ ~ ~ 
marginal rate of substituting the good in state 1 for the good 
hi 
in state 2, given the allocation x and actions a • 
I\, 
Allocations along the contract curve satisfy 
-- and thus -----
which is independent of the actions. 
4.5 PARETO OPTIMAL STRATEGIES 
au11/axi1 
au11/ax~1 
au21/axi1 
= -----, au21/ax~1 
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AI\, 
Let S denote the set of Pareto optimal strategies when 
actions are enforceable. Following the usual presentation of 
A A A AI\, 
Pareto optima, each member s =(x ,a )eS is the solution to a 
problem of the form 
(4.5.1) 
(4.5.2) 
(4.5.3) 
Max 
x a 
I\, I\, 
s.t. 
s.t. 
I\, I\, I\, 
j=l,2 
where ~ =~h' denotes the sum over all hi belonging to 1\,; 
I\, 1el\, 
whi is a given level of expected utility for agent hi. To 
and 
derive 
AI\, -hi, , 
the other members of S , W 1S var1ed over all feasible 
values hi 11 h' of W ,for a 1~11. 
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*K, 
Let 8 denote the set of Pareto optimal strategies when 
actions are unenforceable. Assuming that each agent chooses 
his own action under Nash conjectures, a is an equilibrium 
K, 
vector of actions if 
(4.5.4) hi a e hi hi hi, argmax W (x ,a ,aK,\{hi}) 
hi, 
a 
'v'hieK, 
where aK,\{hi} is the vector of all, except agent hi's, actions. 
* * * *K, Each Pareto optimal strategy s =(x ,a )e8 is the solution to a 
K, K, K, 
problem of the form (4.5.1)-(4.5.4). The entire set of Pareto 
-hi 
optimal strategies is found by varying W ,over all feasible 
hi values of W ,for all hi~ll. 
The principal-agent models described in (1.2.2) and 
(1.2.4) in Chapter 1 are a special case of (4.5.1)-(4.5.4), and 
are obtained by imposing the following restrictions. Let r=l. 
Assigning to agent 11 the role of principal, 
11 is a constant, a 
so that agent 11 does not take an active part in altering the 
probabilities of the states. Therefore, agent 21 does not 
demand any actions from agent 11. Further, agent 21 has no 
claim over the endowment, receiving a payment c, from the total 
J 
endowment, and leaving agent 11 with a net return of 
11 21 w. +w. -c., j=1,2. Thus, agent 21 has no bargaining power in 
J J J 
determining the precise nature of the compensation. Thirdly, 
the conventional principal-agent approach considers only one 
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A~ *~ 
member of S (if actions are enforceable) or S (if actions are 
unenforceable). The last.two restrictions are particularly 
limiting, as they assume away the question of what contracts 
result from bargaining among agents. The analysis below 
investigates this issue, using the core as the solution 
concept. 
It is well-known that the presence of public goods 
creates problems for a definition of the core. It requires a 
theory of the way in which the complementary coalition -e 
reacts, when a coalition e attempts to block a potential 
contract for the entire group~. Rosenthal (197l) and Richter 
(1974) suggest that, given a potential blocking coalition, the 
complementary coalition might choose a contract which is group 
rational. But, this requires a definition of the core of the 
group -e. The problem is resolved by using an inductive 
approach to define the 
5 
core. Suppose that, in response to a 
blocking coalition, -e suggests a contract for its own members. 
A coalition, ~ of -e may attempt to block that contract, in 
which case a definition of the core is required for the now 
smaller complementary coalition -(e+~); and so on, until the 
complementary coalition reduces to one agent, for whom a core 
is easily defined. 
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4.6 A DEFINITION OF THE CORE 
Edgeworth, Debreu and Scarf formulated a theory of the 
core for a private goods economy. Their definition of the core 
is now extended, to the economy of section 4.3. This requires a 
characterization of core actions as well as core allocations. 
It is assumed that actions are observable, so that they can be 
written into a contract. The following assumption specifies 
the conditions under which an agent agrees to sign a contract 
which stipulates his action,6,7 so that the action is legally 
enforceable. 
Assumption 4 
Agent hi's action a hi is enforceable by the coalition e if and 
only if hi€e. 
Thus, agents who belong to a coalition e are willing to sign a 
contract, written by the coalition for its own members, 
specifying their actions (and allocations). The reason for the 
willingness of agents in e to sign some such contract is that, 
if actions are observable, there always exists a contract 
stipulating actions of all agents in the coalition, which is 
Pareto-superior to a contract with does not stipulate any 
actions. Formally, if actions are not written into a contract, 
then the maximization problem of the coalition contains 
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incentive-compatibility constraints of the form in (4.5.4) for 
all agents in 0, which need not be satisfied otherwise. The 
intuition is provided by the principal-agent literature, namely 
that, when actions are enforced, a better risk-sharing 
arrangement is possible. 
On the other hand, agents who do not belong to 0 do not 
share risks with agents in B, and hence do not have an 
incentive to allow that coalition to enforce their actions. 
When the model is interpreted as a generalization of the 
principal-agent model, Assumption 4 can be seen as an 
assumption about the extent of moral hazard in the economy. 
since contracts in the core involve cooperation by all agents, 
such contracts do not exhibit moral hazard. Likewise, there is 
no moral hazard within coalitions. However, a coalition may 
choose actions that are undesirable from the viewpoint of 
agents not in the coalition (and vice versa). In this way the 
possibility of moral hazard determines the success of blocking 
coalitions, and this determines which contracts are in the 
8 
core. 
Assumption 4 implies that a strategy s =(x fa ,a B) can 
B B 0 -
be implemented by a coalition B only if the complementary 
coalition willingly chooses the actions a -B 
In determining 
whether a strategy s can be blocked, the coalition must 
'" 
therefore consider the choices of the complementary coalition. 
As discussed in section 4.5 this requires an assumption about 
87 
the behavior of the complementary coalition. The definition of 
the core below assumes that, given the formation of any 
coalition, its complementary coalition chooses a group rational 
strategy; that is, a strategy from the core of the group -0, 
given the actions of the coalition o. 
The core is now defined.
9 
Definition 1 
A A A 
(a) In a single agent economy s=(x,Q) is a contract in the core 
A 
if and only if x ~ w (so that the allocation is feasible), 
A _ A A 
Q€{~,Q} (so that the action is feasible), and (x,Q) maximizes 
W(x,Q) . 
(b) Let 1 < q < 2r and assume that the core for an economy with 
q agents has been defined. Then 
A A A A 
(i) For any economy with 2r agents, s =(x ,Q ,Q ) is a o 0 0 -0 
strategy which 0 is able to implement if and only if 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Ahi hi 
2; x ~ 2; w o 0 
hi - . Q €{~,Q} vh~€O; and 
A 
any strategy s' =(x ,Q ,Q ) which belongs to the 
-0 -0 0 -0 
/
A t' f' A 10 core of the subeconomy r s sa ~s ~es Q =Q o -0 -0 
A 
(ii) 0 blocks s~ if and only if there exists a strategy So 
such that 
A 
(1) 0 is able to implement s . o ' and 
A 
(2 ) s is preferred to s by all agents in o , and 
0 K, 
strictly preferred by some agent in o • 
(iii) s €core of an economy with 2r agents if and only if 
~ 
hi hi (1) ~ x ~ ~ w 
~ ~ 
hi -(2) a €{g,a} Vhi€~; and 
(3) ~B€e which blocks s . 
~ 
The definition works as follows. Suppose that the 
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agents in a group ~ are considering whether to sign a contract 
s. If a coalition B decides not to engage in exchange with 
~ 
the group -B, then the latter suggests allocations and actions 
for its members, taking as given the actions of agents in B. 
If no subgroup within -B is dissatisfied with these allocations 
and actions, and if the actions are consistent with B's 
strategy (condition bi3); and B's suggested allocations and 
actions for its own members are feasible (bil and bi2), then 
B's strategy can be implemented by B. If that strategy is also 
(strictly) preferred to the original suggestion s , then s is 
~ ~ 
blocked by B (bii). If, on the other hand, no coalition is 
able to find such a blocking strategy (biii3), then, as long as 
s is feasible (biiil and biii2), s belongs to the core of the 
~ ~ 
group~. It might therefore be written into a contract, and 
observed. 
Implicit in the above definition of the core is that 
coalitions exhibit Nash behavior. Given the actions of Band 
its own endowment, the complementary coalition -B chooses 
actions a for itself. Likewise, the coalition B takes as 
-B 
given the choices of the complementary coalition and its own 
endowment when choosing its own actions a • o 
The following sections derive properties of the core. 
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To simplify the notation it is assumed that agents of different 
types have identical utility functions. However, all results 
hold for any utility functions satisfying the conditions in 
section 4.3. All proofs assume that actions are feasible 
hi -
(a €{f!,a} \fhi). The "r-core" denotes the core of an economy 
with r (identical) pairs of agents. 
4.7 THE CORE AND PARETO OPTIMALTIY 
In the private goods model of Debreu and Scarf it is 
shown that a core allocation is Pareto optimal. If an 
allocation is suboptimal, then it is blocked by the coalition 
of all agents. This is a property also of the present model: 
Lemma 1 
If s =(x ,a )€r-core, any r, then s is Pareto optimal. 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
/\ /\ /\ 
Proof: Let s be suboptimal, and let s =(x ,a~) be a Pareto 
~ ~ ~ .v 
optimal strategy. Consider o=~. /\ Because s is feasible and 
/\ 
-0 is empty, 0 is able to implement so. 
/\ 
Further, So is 
preferred to s 
~ 
some agent in o. 
by all agents in 0 and strictly preferred by 
Hence, 0 blocks s , which contradicts the 
~ 
assumption that s cr-core. R 
I\, 
The solution to a problem of the form 
characterized by perfect risk-sharing (see, 
Borch, 1962) . :further, given the functional 
Pareto optimal strategy stipulates identical 
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(4.5.1)-(4.5.3) is 
for instance, 
form of 11", a 
actions for all 
agents. Thus, by Lemma 1 all core contracts stipulate perfect 
risk-sharing and identical actions. Formally, given well-
behaved preferences, a core contract s satisfies 
I\, 
(4.7.1) hi k,e MRS(x ,a )=MRS(x ,a) 
I\, I\, 
(4.7.2) 
Diagrammatically, in an economy with one agent of each 
type, Lemma 1 eliminates from the core all strategies 
stipulating allocations not on the contract curve. Further, 
since strategies with mixed actions are suboptimal, 
indifference curves parameterized by mixed actions are not 
relevant. 
4.8 THE CORE OF AN ECONOMY WITH ONE PAIR OF AGENTS 
In the model of Debreu and Scarf it is also readily 
shown that if, for some agent, an allocation is not 
individually rational (that is, it is not at least as good as 
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his endowment), then it is blocked by that agent. In the model 
of section 4.3 an agent will block a suggested contract if it 
is not as good as what he .can achieve without any cooperation. 
This requires an analysis of what an agent can achieve in 
autarky when there is no exchange of the good. Consider an 
economy with one pair of agents. Assumption 5 below limits the 
class of agents' characteristics, and, by eliminating from the 
set of Pareto optimal strategies those which are not 
individually rational, allows a description of contracts in the 
I-core (Lemma 2). 
To state the assumption and characterize the I-core, it 
is convenient to define Pareto optimal allocations u,v,y and z 
(see Figure 4.14.3) satisfying: 
11 11 
W(u ,g )=W(w ,g) 
'" '" 11 - 11 -W(v ,Q )=W(w ,Q) 
'" '" 21 21 
W(y ,g )=W(w ,g) 
'" '" 21 - 21 -W(z ,Q )=W(w ,Q) 
'" '" 
Assumption 5 
The expected utility functions and endowments of agents 11 and 
21 satisfy 
(a) 
(b) 
hI -
W (w ,Q) 
'" 21 -
W (w ,Q) 
'" 
hI > W (w ,g) 
'" 21 
> W(x ,g) 
'" 
h=1,2 
21 
"IX such that 
21 
x. 
J 
21 ~ U. j=1,2 
J 
Part (a) states that in the absence of exchange of the 
good, Q is a Nash equilibrium. 
'" 
is a 
strategy which e={h1} is ~b1e to implement. For instance, if 
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o 21 -
h=l, then the only strategy in the core of r/s{ll} is (w ,Q",)' 
which satisfies, Q {21} =~ {21} . 
Although Q is a Nash equilibrium in autarky, exchange 
'" 
of the good alters agents' incentives to maintain those 
actions. Risk-sharing provides agent 21 with a greater 
incentive to choose Q (since risk-sharing makes state 2 more, 
and state 1 less desirable compared with the endowed 
allocation); but for agent 11 risk-sharing reduces the 
-incentive to choose Q. To maintain agent ll's choice of Q it 
is sufficient that agent 21 threaten him with autarky, which 
removes from agent 11 the benefits from risk-sharing. The 
incentive to carry out such a threat is contained in part (b). 
In terms of the farmers' example, Assumption 5a states 
that, if there is only one pair of farmers, and no trade occurs 
to spread the risks associated with the yield, then if one 
farmer sprays his orchard, the other prefers spraying to not 
spraying his own orchard. However, if apples are traded across 
the high and low yield states, the type 1 farmer's fortunes 
become less dependent on a high yield, so that his incentive to 
continue spraying diminishes. Assumption 5b implies that the 
type 2 farmer's gain from a healthy orchard is sufficiently 
large relative to his gain from risk-sharing, that he is 
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willing to refuse trade with the type 1 farmer, if the latter 
suggests a contract specifying that spraying is not required. 
Thus, if the type 1 farme~ wants to reduce his exposure to the 
risk of a low yield, he must agree to spray his orchard. 
Lemma 2 characterizes contracts in the 1-core, namely 
those which are individually rational as well as Pareto 
optimal: 
Lemma 2 
If s =(x ,a )€l-core then 
'" '" '" 
( a) a =a ; and 
'" '" 
(b) v11 
j 
j=1,2 
Proof: (a) Let s =(x ,~ ). Given that x and u are both Pareto 
'" '" '" '" 
optimal allocations (using Lemma 1 and the definition of u), 
'h ( , ) 11 11, eJ. t er J. x, < u, J =1,2 
J J 
or (ii) 
11 x, 
J 
11 , ~ u, J=1,2. 
J 
o 
If (i) holds, then O={ll} blocks s'" with s{ll}O 
0 
If ( ii) holds, then O={21} blocks s'" with s{21} using 
Assumption 5b. 
(b) Let s =(X ,a ). 
'" '" '" 
Then, by Assumption 5, 
if 
11 11 
j=l,2, then O={ll} blocks s with and x, < v, s{ll}; J J '" x~l z~l 0 if > j=1,2, then O={21} blocks s with s{21}' III J J '" 
Thus, in an economy with one pair of agents core contracts are 
characterized by perfect risk-sharing and high effort from both 
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agents. 
4.9 THE CORE WHEN THERE ARE r PAIRS OF AGENTS 
When the, economy is replicated, agents in a 
complementary coalition, no matter how small, can significantly 
alter the welfare of agents in the coalition, because of their 
potential effect on the value of~. If a coalition desires ;, 
all agents in the complementary coalition must choose Q. This 
distinguishes the model from the conventional Debreu-Scarf 
model in which any agent's influence on outcomes becomes 
smaller as the economy grows. 
When there is one pair of agents, a choice of Q by a 
single agent coalition induces the other agent to also choose 
Q. Under risk-sharing the benefits derived by agent 11 are 
sufficient to induce a choice of Q, if that is needed to 
persuade agent 21 to engage in risk-sharing. The incentive 
mechanism of this model therefore works as follows. The agent 
with the greatest incentive to shirk is motivated to choose a 
favorable action by the opportunity it brings to reduce the 
exposure to risk. An issue considered in this section is 
whether replication, by creating new opportunities for risk-
sharing, creates incentives for any agent to choose~. It is 
shown that, whatever the size of the economy, agents agree only 
on actions found in I-core contracts. Thus, the incentive to 
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choose a are maintained under replication. This result is used 
to show that identical ag~nts are treated equally in the core, 
and that the core shrinks to a competitive contract as the 
economy grows. ,When Debreu and Scarf prove shrinkage of the 
core for a private goods economy, they first show that, 
whatever the size of the economy, agents of the same type 
receive identical consumption bundles. Given this, they show 
that the core shrinks to a competitive allocation as the 
economy grows large. In the present model, it does not seem 
possible to prove the equal treatment property for an economy 
with r pairs of agents without proving that the core shrinks as 
the economy grows from 1 to r-I pairs. The results are 
therefore extended as follows. It is shown that there is equal 
treatment in the 2-core, and that the 2-core is contained in 
the I-core. Effort by 2 pairs of agents is therefore high, 
whatever strategy is actually chosen. These results are then 
extended by induction to the r-core. 
Lemma 3 
hi hk hi hk 
If s =(x ,a )€2-core, then x =x and a =a h,i,k=1,2. 
~ ~ ~ 
Proof: If s €2-core, then actions are identical by Lemma 1 and 
~ 
hI h2 kl k2 
(4.7.2). Let a =a h=1,2 and x ~x k=l or 2. 
W.I.o.g. let e={11,21} be the worse-treated pair of agents. 
Given a , C (in Appendix 1, section 4.12) implies that there 
I<: 1 
exists a feasible xo such that 
(4.9.1) 
Ahi hi 
W(x ,a) ~ W(x ,a) VhieO with> for some hieO. 
I<: I<: 
A A A A A 
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Consider s ==(x ,a ), a ==a o o· I<: I<: I<: (So and sl<: stipulate the same vector 
A 
of actions). 0 is able to implement se if core strategies 
A A 
s' == (x , a , a ) 
-0 -0 e -0 in the subeconomy rise satisfy a =a • -0 -0 
A 
Let a =a. Then a =a as required. 
-0 --0 I<: -I<: 
A A 
a =a • 
I<: I<: 
Let Then, because riso is like an economy with r=l, -0 
chooses a strategy satisfying a =a by Lemma 2a. 
-0 -0 
A 
Hence, 0 is able to implement so. Then with (4.9.1) 0 blocks 
s , so that contracts in the 2-core stipulate identical 
I<: 
allocations within types of agents. _ 
As in the Debreu-Scarf theory, the equal treatment 
property implies that the theory can be written with reference 
to a representative pair of agents (li,2i). Lemma 4 shows that 
contracts belonging to the 2-core do not involve allocations 
and actions that are not in the 1-core: 
Lemma 4 
Let r=2. Let a strategy s ==(x ,a ) be such that 
I<: I<: I<: 
1i 2i 1i 2i , S=(x ,x ,a fa )$l-core ~=1,2. Then s $2-core. 
I<: 
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Proof: Since s~l-core 3~~{11,2l}=~ which blocks s with a 
• strategy s. Either 
~ 
(i) ~={11,2l} and • • • s = (x ,0:) or ~ ~ ~ . . . (11) ~={hl} and s o =s{hl} h=l or 2. 
consider (i). 
A Ahl Ah2 .hl 
Let o=~ and let So be such that x =x =x and 
Ahl Ah2 .hl A. 
0: =0: =0: h=l,2. 0 is able to implement so' because s~ is 
A 
feasible, so that So is feasible, and because -0 is empty. 
Further, for h,i=l,2 
Ahi A 
W(x ,0:) = 
~ 
.hl • 
W(x ,o:~) 
hl ~ W(x ,o:~) 
hi = W(x ,0:). 
~ 
Hence, 0 blocks s . 
~ 
> for h=l or 2 
A _ 
Let 0={hl,h2} and s =(w ,0: ). o 0 ~ consider (ii). 
k..e -
Since W(w ,0:) 
~ 
> W(Wk..e,g ) k~h ..e=l,2 (Assumption 5a), -0 
~ 
A 
chooses 0: , given 0: -0 O· Hence, e is able to implement s 
Further, for i=l,2 
hi -
W(w ,0:) = 
~ 
hl -
W(w ,o:~) 
hl 
> W(x ,o:~) 
hi 
= W(x ,0:). 
~ 
Hence, 0 blocks s. • 
~ 
o • 
Given Lemma 2a, Lemma 4 implies that contracts in the 2-core 
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always stipulate high effort. 
It is now possible to prove that there is equal 
treatment in the core for 'any number of replications: 
Proposition 1 
hi hk hi hk 
If s =(x ,a )€r-core, then x =x and a =a vi,k€{l, ... ,r) 
~ ~ ~ 
h=1,2. 
Proof: The proposition holds when the number of pairs p equals 
2, by Lemma 3. Assume that the proposition holds when 3~p~r-l. 
It can then be shown that the (r-l)-core~l-core using an 
argument analogous to the proof of Lemma 4. Hence, if 
s =(x ,a )€(r-l)-core, then s.~€l-core where 1/J={li,2i} 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
i=l, •.. ,r-l, so that a =a by Lemma 2a. It can then be shown 
~ ~ 
that the proposition holds when p=r, using an argument 
analogous to the proof of Lemma 3. • 
Given equal treatment in the r-core, Lemma 4 can be 
extended to the r-core, using an argument analogous to the 
proof of Lemma 4: 
Lemma 5 
Ii 2i li 2i . Let s =(x ,a ) be such that (x ,x ,a a )~l-core ~=l, ... ,r. 
~ ~ ~ 
Then s ~r-core. 
~ 
Lemma 5 implies 
Lemma 6 
If s =(x ,a )€r-core, then a =a • 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
Proof: Immediate from Lemmas 5 and 2a. • 
Now consider an economy, identical to the economy 
described in section 4.3, but with the value of ~ exogenously 
given by;. Let w:xhi ~ R be defined by 
\fhi€~ 
U as defined in section 4.3. 
- -Ii -2i Let x=(x ,x ) i=l, ... ,r denote the bundle, which a 
representative pair of agents would consume at an equilibrium 
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in a competitive market for state-contingent claims against the 
private good, given that; is the probability of state 2. x is 
illustrated in Figure 4.14.4. 
Definition 2 
- -11 -2r Let x =(x , ... ,x ). 
~ 
Formally, 
A competitive equilibrium in a market for state-claims against 
the private good, given that ~ is the probability of state 2, 
'" - -11 -2r is a system of prices (P1,P2) and an allocation (x , ... ,x ) 
such that 
-hi 
(a) x is a solution to 
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s.t. 'v'hie~; and 
(b) ~ 
~ 
-hi 'hi x = ~ w 
~ 
Proposition 2 shows that the set of core contracts 
... - -shrinks to the contract s=(x ,a ) as the economy grows large: 
~ ~ 
Proposition 2 
If s er-core 'v'r, then s =s. 
~ ~ 
Proof: If s er-core any r, then a =a by Lemma 6 , so that 
~ ~ ~ 
7C(a )=7Co 
~ 
Then, using C2 (see Appendix 1) 
4.10 EXISTENCE OF THE CORE 
x =X • 
~ ~ 
If Assumption 5b is strengthened to Assumption 6 below, 
it may be shown that the core, as defined in section 4.6, 
exists for the model of section 4.3. The argument extends that 
used by Debreu and Scarf, who show that the competitive 
allocation in a private goods economy is always contained in 
... 
the core. In the present model, s is always contained in the 
core. 
Let t be a Pareto optimal allocation satisfying 
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= MRS (Wli 0: ) , -I';, 
In words, for a representative pair (li,2i) of agents, t is the 
allocation which perfectly shares risks, and is just affordable 
to agent li, given a low probability (K) that state 2 will 
occur, and a relative price of the good in state 1 equal to 
agent li's marginal rate of sUbstitution at his endowment (see 
Figure 4.14.3). To prove existence of the core (proposition 3) 
Assumption 5b is replaced by: 
Assumption 6 
21 - 21 21 W(w ,0:) > W(x ,~) vx such that 
K. I';, 
21 x, 
J 
Proposition 3 
~ 
s€r-core vr. 
Proof: Let s~r-core, some r. Then 30 which blocks s with the 
A A A _ A A 
strategy so' Either (a) s =(x ,0: ) or (b) s =(x ,~ ). o 0 K. 0 0 I';, 
consider (a). By c 3 
(in Appendix 1), given 0: =0: 
K. I';, 
and hence 
- does not exist an allocation which can be 7r(0: ) =7r , there xo 
I';, 
used to block x . Hence, there does not exist a strategy 
I';, 
A ~ -
(x ,0: ) which can be used to block (x ,0: ) . o I';, I';, I';, 
Consider (b). Either 
(i) 0 contains only type 1 agents; or 
(ii) 0 contains at least one type 2 agent. 
1\ 
Consider (i) since all agents in 0 are identical, X =w . o 0 
Moreover, if 0 blocks s, then 
li -li -W(w ,g) ~ W(x ,a) vli€o with> for some lieO. 
K, K, 
li -> W(w ,a) since gains from risk-sharing 
K, 
exist. This contradicts Assumption 5a. 
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Consider (ii). W.l.o.g. let 0 contain agent 21. If 0 blocks 
s, then 
1\21 -21 - 21 -
W(x ,g) ~ W(x ,a) > W(w ,a) 
K, K, K, 
since gains from risk-sharing exist. Hence, using Assumption 
1\21 21 , 
6, x, >t, J=1,2. But, then at least one type 1 agent, say 
J J 
agent 11, must buy the good in state 1 from agent 21 at a price 
. 11 
exceeding MRS(w ,g), so that 
K, 
1\11 11 11 -
W(x ,g) < W(w ,g) < W(w ,a) by Assumption 5a 
K, K, K, 
..... 11 -
< W (x ,a) 
K, 
since gains from risk-sharing exist. Thus, if 0 is able to 
1\ 
implement s , this strategy can not also be preferred by all 
o 
agents in o. For both (a) and (b) the assumption that there 
..... 
exists a coalition which blocks s therefore leads to a 
contradiction. _ 
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4.11 CONCLUSION 
A number of authors have observed that the existence of 
public goods creates interdependencies, which need not be 
considered in a, theory of the core for a private goods economy. 
An economy with moral hazard is an example of a public goods 
economy, since agents' actions may be interpreted as public 
goods. The definition of the core and Assumptions 4-6 show 
that to accomodate those actions the Debreu-Scarf theory of the 
core must be extended in various directions. In particular, a 
specification is needed of 
-the behavior of agents who are left out of a coalition 
(Definition Ibi3); 
-the extent of moral hazard (Assumption 4) ; 
-the effect of replication, which adds more agents, and hence 
more actions (captured in the functional form of ~). 
For a particular class of moral hazard economies it is 
shown that the core exists, that core contracts specify 
identical treatment of identical agents, and that the core 
shrinks as the economy grows large. The limiting contract is 
the one that prevails in a competitive market, in which agents 
trade state-claims against the private good, taking as given 
-that ~ is the probability of the favorable state. 
The result that the core exists implies that, for the 
class of economies under consideration, agents will contract to 
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avoid moral hazard. Specifically, they will not split into 
multiple coalitions, each confronted with the possibility of 
moral hazard on the part of other coalitions. The analysis 
shows that agents will come to a collective agreement about the 
optimal set of actions, and will carry out those actions. 
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4.12 APPENDIX 1 
Let x be defined ~s in section 4.9. The following 
existing results about the core in a private goods economy then 
apply (see, fo~ instance, varian, 1984): 
f "hi hk , c
1
: I x~ satlsfles x ~x some h and l~k, then the 
coalition B={worst-treated pair of agents) blocks x . 
c . 2 • 
4.13 
~ 
Given n, if x er-core vr, then x =x . 
~ ~ ~ 
Given n, X er-core Vr. 
~ 
APPENDIX 2 
The forcing contract of Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) and 
similar models has the following form: 
1\ 1\ 
C,=c, iff a=a i=1,2 
1 1 
1\ 
c,=O iff a":a i=1,2 
1 
where c, is the payment received by the agent in state i, and 
1 
1\ 1\ 1\ 
(c
1
,c
2
,a) is the optimal contract when actions can be 
contracted upon. By threatening to withhold the agent's 
payment, the principal induces him to take the assigned 
action. 
In the model of section 4.3 the question arises how 
agents force actions onto one another, given that there is no 
outsider, such as a principal, who can punish a shirking agent 
by confiscating his payment. Agent hiES may confiscate the 
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allocation of agent k~ES if the latter shirks but agent hi may 
also shirk! It is not possible to threaten every agent with 
confiscation of his allocation, unless the court (or other 
outside party) takes some of the endowment as punishment. 
However, ex post (all agents having shirked), it is preferable 
to keep the entire endowment within the group, so that noone 
may want to involve the court. The question is how the 
contract can give some agent an incentive to take the group to 
court whenever there is shirking (even if he himself shirks). 
It is shown below that if, having written the contract, agents 
choose actions under Nash conjectures, then there exists a 
forcing contract, which motivates all agents to choose the 
specified actions, yet allocates the total endowment to the 
group, regardless of any shirking. 
Ah' Ahi 
Let x 1 and a be the allocation and action assigned to 
* agent hiEo. Let w denote the ex post total endowment; let 0 
hi Ahi 
denote the subset of agents in 0 who choose a Fa ; and let 
101 denote the cardinal number of o. Then the forcing contract 
is 
(FI) If * then xhi=~hi VhiEO 0=0 
(F2) If * 0${0,0} then 
xhi=o ' * Vh1EO 
h' * x 1= w/lo\ol , \* Vh1EO 0 
(F3) * If B=B then 
VhiEB\{pq} some arbitrary pqEB 
Under such a contract the total endowment is always 
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consumed within the coalition. If noone shirks everyone 
receives the assigned allocation. If some, but not all, agents 
shirk, the total endowment is distributed among the non-
shirking agents. (This is similar to the traditional 
principal-agent forcing contract, where the non-shirking party 
- namely, the principal - receives the total outcome.) If all 
agents shirk then one (chosen in any fashion and specified in 
the contract before the actions are carried out) receives the 
total endowment of the coalition. 
All agents are then induced, in the following way, to 
carry out the assigned actions. consider any agent hi. If all 
other agents carry out the assigned actions, then the best 
strategy for agent hi is to do likewise (by (Fl) and (F2)). 
Thus, choosing the agreed upon actions by all agents is a Nash 
equilibrium. Now suppose that some agents shirk, while others 
do not. The best strategy of a given agent hi is to take the 
assigned action, to avoid losing his endowment (by (F2)). 
Therefore, a situation where a subgroup of agents shirks is not 
a Nash equilibrium. If all agents other than agent hi shirk, 
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then the best course is for agent hi to not shirk, so that he 
can claim the entire endowment (by (F3)). 
Proposition 4 
There exists an-efficient forcing contract for the coalition e. 
Proof: Consider the contract (Fl)-(F3). The set of chosen 
actions must satisfy one of the following: 
(a) All agents choose the agreed upon actions; 
(b) A proper subset of agents shirks; or 
(c) All agents shirk. 
It is shown that only the first constitutes a Nash equilibrium. 
k~ Ak~, Ah' 
Let Q =Q Vk~Ee\{h1}. If agent hi chooses Q 1, then his 
Ah' A 
expected utility is W(x 1,Q »0 by (Fl). Otherwise it is -
'" hi Ahi 
Q' sO by (F2). Hence, agent hi chooses Q . This is true for 
all hiEe, so that (a) is a Nash equilibrium. 
k~ Ak~ * k~ Ak~ * Let Q ~Q Vk~Ee~{0,e} k~~hi, and let Q =Q Vk~Ee\(eu{hi}). 
Ahi 
If agent hi chooses Q ,then his expected utility is 
I * I ' 't' hi b ( ) W(w/ e\e ,Q ) by (F2). Otherw1se 1 1S -Q Y F2 . 
'" 
Hence, 
Ah' 
agent hi choose Q 1. This is true for all hi€e, so that (b) is 
not a Nash equilibrium. 
Let Qk~~~k~ Vk~Ee\{hi} with hi~pq (pq as defined in (F3)). If 
Ah' 
agent hi chooses Q 1, then his expected utility is W(w,Q ) by 
'" 
(F2). Otherwise it is _Qhi by (F3). Hence, agent hi chooses 
109 
Ahi 
Q ,so that (c) is not a Nash equilibrium. 
A 
The contract (Fl)-(F3) therefore generates Q e as a unique Nash 
equilibrium, and distributes the total endowment of e within 
that coalition., _ 
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4.14 FIGURES 
Figure 4.14.1 
Figure 4.14.2 
III 
Figure 4.14.3 
~---------------------, 0
21 
r---------------------__ 0
21 
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4.15 NOTES 
1. Thus, the model is.a generalization of Chapter 3, which 
allows the principal to choose an action, but does not allow 
the agent to bargain for a return above his reservation 
expected utility. 
2. The uncertainty in this model is common to all agents -
if state 1 occurs all agents receive a small endowment, and if 
state 2 occurs all receive a large endowment. 
3. Since actions are observable, they can be contracted 
upon. 
4. Since strategies not in the core never form the basis of 
a legally enforceable contract, the term "contract" will be 
used only to describe strategies which do belong to the core. 
5. The use of induction was suggested by the definition of 
Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium by Bernheim and others (1987). 
6. In principal-agent models, actions which are observable 
are also enforceable, because it is implicitly assumed that the 
principal and agent constitute a coalition. In this model, 
observability of actions is not sufficient for their 
enforceability, because agents do not necessarily belong to the 
same coalition. 
7. In the conventional principal-agent model, if actions 
are enforced, the associated contract is called a "forcing" 
contract. It specifies which actions should be taken, and at 
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the same time provides incentives to the agent to take the 
specified actions. Appendix 2 in section 4.13 expands on the 
nature of the forcing contract in the conventional model and 
for the model of section 4.3. 
8. Moral ha?ard is a more serious problem if actions are 
unobservable, and hence unenforceable within coalitions. In 
such a world contracts in the core are likely to exhibit moral 
hazard. 
9. Although the definition uses the set of agents 
~={11, ..• ,2r}, it is not necessary to restrict the group to two 
types or an equal number of agents within types. However, 
those restrictions are necessary in the following analysis. 
A 
10. Since e is non-empty, the subeconomy rise contains fewer 
than 2r agents. Its core is therefore defined by the assumption 
in the stem of part b. 
CHAPTER 5 
INCENTIVES AND INSURANCE IN A PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM 
EDUCATION MODEL 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
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Schultz (1961), Becker (1962), Ben-Porath (1967), and 
Razin (1972a, 1972b) among others initiated a study of the way 
in which individuals make decisions about investments in 
education. Schultz, Becker, and more recently Levhari and 
Weiss (1974) and Eaton and Rosen (1980) observe that since 
there is generally imperfect information about such factors as 
abilities, the quality of schooling or the future return to 
skill, uncertainty plays an important role in those decisions. 
The analysis below extends this literature by introducing 
endogenous uncertainty. Specifically, the expected amount of 
human capital that results from education depends upon the 
graduation rate, which is affected by students' decisions about 
effort and the level of education. 
One effect of uncertainty about the return to education 
is that the private sector is generally unwilling to provide 
consumer loans to finance education (for example, Schultz, 
1961p.14). The possibility of moral hazard also contributes to 
this state of affairs (for example, Manning, 1985, p.18). As a 
115 
result governments often support education by way of loans or 
subsidies. 
Using a two-period overlapping generations model, it is 
assumed that students have no access to private sector funds, 
but that the government makes available a sum of money during 
the period of study. It collects money when individuals become 
full-time workers in the following period in order to fund the 
following generation of students. Such a scheme may be 
interpreted as a loan facility, with students funding (part of) 
their consumption from loans, and repaying the loans when they 
begin full-time work (this is the interpretation adopted 
below) ~ or as a subsidy paid to students, funded from taxes 
levied on full-time workers. 
The provision of loans introduces a second issue -
namely moral hazard - in the following way. Although students 
eventually repay the loans made available to them, the fact 
that repayments are always used to fund the following 
generation of students, may change students' incentives to 
study. Each dollar earned by a full-time worker is only 
partially consumed by himself, the remainder being paid to the 
creditor. Suppose that graduates make higher repayments than 
failures, so that an increase in student effort raises the 
expected repayment. Effort then generates a positive 
externality and, since students do not take this into account, 
they supply too little effort. 
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A consequence of the possibility of moral hazard is that 
individuals may not be able to buy private sector insurance 
against low future incomes. This problem is observed by Eaton 
and Rosen (1980) and by Manning (1985). It is shown below that 
the government"by appropriately specifying the terms of 
repayment of student loans, can insure the return to education. 
In particular, if a student who graduates and therefore earns a 
higher income during the rest of his life, faces a higher 
repayment than a student who fails, then the loan scheme 
reduces the gap between disposable skilled and unskilled 
income. (It is shown that such a scheme is always optimal, so 
that there is cause for moral hazard as identified in the 
preceeding paragraph.) 
In terms of the principal-agent literature endogeneity 
of the education level adds a new dimension to the moral hazard 
problem. It means that the duration of the principal-agent 
relationship, which in the model below encompasses two periods, 
1 is endogenous. Further, if, for a given level of effort, a 
higher education makes a student less likely to graduate, then 
(given some insurance of the return to education) education 
exerts a negative externality, because it lowers the 
, , 2 
government's funding for educat1ng the next generat10n. An 
issue considered below is how a shift in the control of effort 
from the government to students affects students' choice of 
education. 
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The analysis further considers the socially optimal 
level of insurance, given an exogenous government loan. Since 
the analysis does not solve for the optimal size of the loan, 
it should be interpreted as describing the second-best optima. 
The principal-agent literature suggests that for a given level 
of education, if the chances of graduating depend only on the 
level of effort, then a government which controls (does not 
control) effort should choose the terms of repayment to fully 
(partially) insure income. A question is whether this 
continues to hold when the level of education is a choice 
variable. 
A third issue concerns the effect of a change in the 
population growth rate on the optimal repayments terms, the 
level of student effort and the level of education. This is 
investigated in a model in which the choice of education is 
endogenous, but does not affect the probability of graduating. 
The analysis is arranged as follows. Section 5.2 
describes a model of education. section 5.3 studies the nature 
of education and the effect of population growth when the 
government controls student effort. This is repeated in 
section 5.4 when the government is unable to control effort. 
The results are summarized in section 5.5. 
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5.2 A MODEL OF EDUCATION3 
consider a partial equilibrium overlapping generations 
model in which each generation lives two periods. The model 
does not generate full equilibria, because it assumes away the 
response of relative wages to changes in the composition of the 
workforce. 4 The typical individual is endowed with a unit of 
productive time 5 in each period. An individual 
t can use the productive time in that period to 
education and to work for an unskilled wage of 
be the amount of time allocated to education. 
(l-J3(t))w (t) is the individual's income. 
o 
born in period 
get an 
w (t). 
0 
Let J3(t) 
Then 
It is assumed that there are no capital markets. It is 
taken as given that an education is feasible only with outside 
funding, that the government provides such finance by way of a 
loan L, and that from the point of view of the individual it is 
optimal to acquire an education. To simplify the analysis the 
amount L is exogenous. Consumption in period t by a newly born 
individual is therefore 
(5.2.1) C(t) = L + (l-J3(t))w (t) o 
During period t the individual, as a student, engages in 
effort a(t). This is a fraction of the individual's leisure 
t ' 6 J.me. 
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In period t+l the individual works during his productive 
time. The wage depends on whether he fails or graduates. If 
he fails he continues to earn an unskilled wage w (t+l). If he 
o 
graduates he earns a skilled wage which is dependent on the 
level of education. Let W(B(t),t+l)7 denote the skilled wage 
in period t+l. Assume that it increases with the level of 
education at a diminishing rate: 
Assumption 1 
w l (.) > 0, w"(·) < ° 
with superscripts denoting derivatives. 
In period t+l the government requires repayment of the 
loans granted in period t. If a student fails in period t, 
then the government requires that ~ (t+l) per dollar be repaid 
o 
in period t+l; if he graduates then ~l(t+l) per dollar must be 
repaid. If ~.>l then there is an implicit interest payment. 
J. 
Net income and (in the absence of capital markets) consumption 
are therefore 
(5.2.2) 
if the student fails; or 
(5.2.3) C1(t+l) = w(B(t) ,t+l) - ~l(t+l)L 
if the student graduates. 
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The probability of graduating is ~(a(t),B(t)), being a 
function of the level of student effort, and the level of 
education. For a given level of education, more effort 
increases the chances of graduating, at a diminishing rate. On 
the other hand" given a level of effort, a higher education 
lowers the probability of graduating, at an increasing rate. 
Changes in effort do not affect the marginal effect of 
education on the probability of graduating: 
AssumI2tion 2 
a B ~ (.) > 0, ~ (.) < ° 
~ aa ( . ) < 0, ~ BB ( . ) < 0, ~ aB ( . ) = ° 
The individual derives utility from consumption and 
disutility from effort, and is risk-averse. Let U and V be 
utility functions over consumption and effort, satisfying 
AssumI2tion 3 
U'(·) > 0, U"(·) < 0, V' ( .) = -1 
Let r(t) be the discount factor of an individual born in 
period t. The discounted expected utility of such a person is 
(5.2.4) W(t) = U(C(t)) - a(t) + 
r(t) [(l-~(a(t),B(t))U(Co(t+l)) + ~(a(t),B(t))U(Cl(t+l))] 
with the consumption levels given by (5.2.1)-(5.2.3). The 
individual is an expected utility maximizer. 
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The variables to be determined are the level of 
education, the level of effort and the repayment terms. The 
level of education B(t) is always determined by the individual, 
the repayment terms ~o(t) and ~l(t) are always determined by 
the government, and the level of effort a(t) is controlled 
either by the individual or the government. If a change in 
effort affects the government's ability to finance future 
loans, and hence social as well as private welfare, it may be 
expected that society is better off if the government specifies 
what effort students take. 
The repayment terms are chosen by the government under 
the constraint that in each period total repayments by 
full-time workers must be sufficient to pay for the loans to 
students in the same period. As long as there are sufficiently 
many students, the actual total repayment equals the expected 
total repayment. Further, if the population grows at rate n, 
then there are always l+n times as many students as full-time 
workers, so that the government's budget constraint in period 
t+l is 
(l+n)S(t)L 5 (1-rr(t»S(t)¢0(t+1)L + rr(t)S(t)¢l(t+l)L 
where S(t) is the number of students in period t and 
rr(t)=rr(a(t) ,B(t» i or 
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(5.2.5) 
The analysis is confined to steady states with w/w 
o 
constant over time. Let w =1 so that w is the skilled relative 
o 
to the unskilled wage. Dropping references to time t, and 
recalling the dependence of n on a and B (5.2.1)-(5.2.5) then 
become 
(5.2.6) c = L + (I-B) c = 1 - ¢ L o 0 
(5.2.7) 
(5.2.8) 
Formally, the problems under consideration are as 
follows. If the government controls students' effort (as well 
as the repayment terms), then the individual faces the 
government-specified parameters (¢o'¢l,a) and chooses the 
expected utility-maximizing level of education. Thus, he 
solves 
(5.2.9) Max 
B 
(5.2.7) s.t. (5.2.6) 
-The solution is the function B(¢O'¢l,a). The government takes 
as given this behavior when it specifies the level of effort 
and repayment terms. The government's objective is to maximize 
social welfare. If all individuals are identical this implies 
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maximizing individual welfare. The government therefore solves 
(5.2.10) Max (5.2.7) 
ifJ
O 
ifJ l Q 
s.t. ( 5 . 2 • 6) and ( 5 . 2 . 8 ) 
If the individual controls effort, he solves 
(5.2.11) Max 
Q B 
(5.2.7) s.t. (5.2.6) 
to generate the optimal levels of effort Q(ifJO,ifJ
l
) and education 
B(ifJo,ifJ
l
). The government takes as given this behavior in its 
choice of the repayment terms, solving 
(5.2.12) Max (5.2.7) 
ifJ o ifJ l 
s.t. 
s.t. (5.2.6) and (5.2.8) 
section 5.3 considers the problems in (5.2.9) and 
(5.2.10), and section 5.4 considers the problems in (5.2.11) 
8 
and (5.2. 12) . 
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5.3 OPTIMAL SKILL, EFFORT AND INSURANCE WHEN THE GOVERNMENT 
CONTROLS STUDENTS' EFFORT 
-If B is an internal solution, then it satisfies the 
first-order con~ition 
(5.3.1) 
- - - -where C=L+l-B, Cl=W(B)-~lL and ~U=U(Cl)-U(Co)' As is 
well-known, the individual chooses the level of education to 
equate the marginal utility from foregone earnings during the 
study period with the expected net marginal utility from 
education during the full-time work period. In this model the 
latter consists of the benefit from expected higher earnings 
9 (measured by the first right-hand side term), and the cost 
from a lower probability of graduating (measured by the second 
right-hand side term) . 
-(5.3.1) implicitly defines B(~O'~l,a). Proposition 1 
-describes the behavior of B. It states that an increase in the 
level of effort raises the optimal level of education, and an 
increase in the per dollar repayment of an (un) skilled worker 
has a (non-)positive effect on the level of education: 
Proposition 1 
8B > 0 8B 0 iff B =0 8B > 0 ~ = n ---
8a 8~o 8~1 
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Proof: All proofs are stated in section 5.6. 
An increase in effort rai$es the probability of graduating, and 
hence the marginal benefit from education (the first right-hand 
side term in (5,.3.1)). This induces the individual to study 
longer. Two effects operate when ~o and ~1 are changed, 
working by way of the right-hand side terms in (5.3.1). The 
first effect is caused by a diminishing marginal utility from 
income (Assumption 1). An increase in ~1 raises the expected 
marginal utility from graduating, inducing the individual to 
choose a longer education. On the other hand, the level of ~ 
o 
does not affect the marginal return from graduating and so does 
not affect the level of education. 10 
The second effect works as follows. A fall in ~ or an 
o 
increase in ~1 reduces ~u and hence IrnB~ul. As explained 
earlier, this term measures one of the costs of raising the 
level of education. Since that cost falls, the individual 
chooses a longer education. If nB=O then there is no such 
effect, in which case changes in ~ have no impact on the level 
o 
of education. 
Given this behavior of the individual and given the 
budget constraint, the government chooses effort and the 
repayment terms to maximize social welfare (problem (5.2.10)). 
Proposition 2 shows that the government should choose the 
repayment terms so as to reduce the net wage differential 
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between skilled and unskilled workers. This involves 
demanding higher repayments from skilled than from unskilled 
workers (part (a)) .11 Further, unless the level of education 
has no impact on the probability of graduating, the government 
should leave so~e wage differential (part (b)). 
Proposition 2 
1\ 1\ 1\ 1\ 
Let effort be controlled by the government. Let (~O'~l,a,B) 
1\ _ 1\ 1\ 1\ 1\ 1\ 
with B=B(~o'~l,a) denote the optimum, and define C =w -~ Land 
000 
1\ 1\ 1\ 
C1=W(B)-~lL. Then 
1\ 1\ 
(a) ~ 0 < ~ 1 
1\ 1\ 
(b) Co :$ C1 = iff 
B 
7r =0 
When the probability of graduating depends only on effort, and 
when the government fully controls effort, students' decisions 
do not generate externalities, so that it is optimal to free 
them from the risks associated with education. By guaranteeing 
a fixed return, the government provides students with full 
insurance. 
If the government balances its budget in each period, 
the result implies that graduates pay back more than the amount 
1\ 
they borrowed (~1>1). Further, if the population growth rate 
is zero (or very low), then balancing of the budget also 
implies that failures pay back less than the amount borrowed 
1\ 
(~<1). This property of the repayment scheme is independent 
o 
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of the fact that the loan is fixed. When the population growth 
rate is high, graduates again repay more than the amount 
borrowed, but it is not clear how much failures repay in 
relation to the loan. Given that the loan is fixed, and that 
the amount of skill (and hence income) that can be accumulated 
by an individual is limited, and given that it is optimal that, 
after repaying their loans, graduates earn more than failures, 
a sufficiently high growth rate cannot be supported by 
graduates alone. Thus, failures would also have to repay more 
than they borrowed. However, this need not hold if the loan is 
endogenous. If the optimal size of the loan falls with an 
increase in the growth rate, then the income of graduates may 
be sufficient to support new generations of students. 
The optimality of full insurance, when effort is 
controlled by the government, is suggested by the principal-
agent model. However, a complete analogy with the principal-
agent model would fix the duration (namely B) of the principal-
agent relationship. In this model the length of education is 
controlled by the agent. Moreover, if it affects the 
probability of graduating, then the full insurance result no 
longer holds. An increase in the education level generates a 
negative externality (by reducing the expected repayment to the 
government), so that the education chosen by the student is 
longer than is socially optimal. By exposing the student to 
some of the associated risks he is induced to choose a shorter 
d t ' 12 e uca l.on. 
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Proposition 2 is a~so reminiscent of Eaton and Rosen's 
results. They show that it is optimal to use the tax system (a 
combination of a wage and a lumpsum tax) to insure against low 
future incomes. In the present model the loan scheme can be 
interpreted as a scheme of subsidies (L) and taxes (¢ Land 
o 
¢lL) the latter being used to provide insurance. A difference 
between the models is that these taxes can also be used as an 
incentive mechanism, influencing the individual's choices in 
education. 
The government may be interested in how it should adjust 
the effort and repayments in response to changes in the 
population growth rate, and how this affects the optimal level 
of skill in the economy. This is addressed in Proposition 3 
and Corollary 1 for a model in which the level of education 
does not affect the probability of graduating. It is found 
that an increase in the population growth rate raises the level 
of the repayments of all full-time workers, raises the level of 
student effort, and raises the level of education: 
Proposition 3 
13 
Let effort be controlled by the government, and let ~ =0. Then 
A 
i=O,l do: > 0 
dn dn 
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Corollary 1 
B Let effort be controlled by the government, and let ~ =0. Then 
A 
dB > 0 
dn 
In order to sustain the transfer of L per student to a larger 
student population, full-time workers are asked to make higher 
repayments. This is achieved by an increase in the 
A A 
repayments, and by an increase in effort, which (given ~o< ~l) 
raises the per capita expected repayment and hence the total 
actual repayment. The increase in effort and the graduate 
repayment induces individuals to choose a longer education. 
Given that both effort and the level of education increase, a 
society with a higher population growth rate should exhibit a 
higher level of skill. 
These results are limited by the assumption that the 
size of the loan is fixed. If the loan were variable, it 
appears likely that an increase in the population growth rate 
would lead the government to reduce the funding of individual 
students, as well as increase the repayments and level of 
effort in order to collect more funds; but, given a smaller 
loan, students are likely to choose a shorter education. This 
effect must be weighed against the effects of higher repayments 
and effort. 
The present formulation may be relevant in the following 
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situation. Suppose that part-time work earns a very low wage, 
so that even if students work, they need at least an amount L 
in additional funding. Unless the alternative of no education 
is optimal, this places a bound on the downward adjustment in 
the loan. In such a case, a higher population growth rate 
causes little adjustment in the loan, and the above results 
apply. 
5.4 OPTIMAL SKILL, EFFORT AND INSURANCE WHEN STUDENTS 
CONTROL EFFORT 
This section repeats the analysis of section 5.3 for the 
case which allows students to effectively control the level of 
effort. Each individual chooses the level of effort and 
education to maximize expected utility (problem (5.2.11)). If 
(~,B) is an interior solution, it satisfies the conditions 
(5.4.1) Q - - -1 = r~ (Q,B)~U 
(5.4.2) 
- - - - - - -
where C=L+l-B, Cl=W(B)-~lL and ~U=U(Cl)-U(Co), The 
interpretation of (5.4.2) is as before (see (5.3.1)). (5.4.1) 
states that at the optimal effort, the utility cost of an extra 
hour of study equals the discounted benefit from higher 
expected earnings. It implies that a positive effort requires 
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that skilled workers have a higher net income than unskilled 
workers. This is well-known from the principal-agent 
literature which suggests .that students must be exposed to some 
of the risk associated with education, as an incentive to 
study. 
(5.4.1) and (5.4.2) implicitly define Q(~O'~l) and 
-B(~O'~l). The behavior of these functions is described in 
Proposition 4. If changes in effort affect the probability of 
graduating strongly (weakly) relative to changes in education, 
then an increase in insurance (an increase in ~1 or a decrease 
in ~ ) lowers the level of effort, and lowers (raises) the 
o 
level of education. 
Proposition 4 
Let effort be controlled by students. If InQ/nBI is large 
(small), then 
> 0, < 0, > a «0), < ° (>0) 
If the burden of loan repayments shifts towards unskilled 
workers, then graduation becomes a more favorable outcome for 
the student, inducing him to study harder. changes in ~ and o 
~ affect the level of education by way of the right-hand side 
1 
terms in (5.4.1) and (5.4.2). An increase in insurance 
coverage reduces the cost of failure (the last term in 
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(5.4.2)), inducing an increase in the level of education. This 
effect also arises when the government controls effort. When 
the government does not control effort there is a further 
effect, operating via changes in the level of effort. By 
inducing a fall in effort, an increase in insurance lowers the 
probability of graduating and hence the benefit from education 
(the first right-hand side term in (5.4.2)), which makes a 
shorter education optimal. Ultimately, the effect depends on 
the size of n a relative to n B • If n a is relatively large then 
additional insurance reduces the level of education. This 
result is opposite to the result in proposition 1. Thus, when 
effort has a relatively large effect on the chances of 
graduating, the effect of insurance on the choice of education 
depends significantly on whether the government is able to 
control effort. 
It was noted earlier that to induce a positive effort by 
students, the government should stop short of fully insuring 
* * them (C <C ). A question is whether it should provide any 
o 1 
insurance at all. Proposition 5 shows that as long as 
individuals are risk-averse some insurance is always optimal: 
Proposition 5 
* * * * Let effort be controlled by students. Let (~O'~l,a,B) with 
* - * * * - * * a=a(~o'~l) and B=B(~o'~l) denote the optimum, and define 
* * * * * * * C =w -~ Land C =W(B)-~lL. Then ~o< ~l· 
000 1 
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The principal-agent literature shows that if education 
is exogenous, then some insurance is optimal even if it induces 
a fall in effort. The endogeneity of education alters the 
optimal amount of insurance. section 5.3 explains that with 
nB<O the government would like to see a shorter education than 
chosen by the student, because education exerts a negative 
externality. Proposition 4 implies that if InQ/nBI is large 
(small) a shorter education can be achieved by an upward 
(downward) adjustment in the amount of insurance that is 
optimal if education does not generate such an externality. 
The discussion of Proposition 2 regarding the 
relationship between the repayment and the amount borrowed 
* * (that is, whether ¢.>l or ¢.<1) also applies here. 
~ ~ 
The effect of changes in the population growth rate when 
the education level has a negligible influence on the 
graduation rate, and the degree of risk-aversion is relatively 
small, is given in Proposition 6 and Corollary 2. It is shown 
that an increase in the population growth rate lowers (raises) 
the per dollar repayments of (un) skilled workers, and raises 
the levels of education and effort: 
Proposition 6 
Let effort be controlled by students. 
B Let n =0, and let 
-U' 'lUi be sufficiently small. Then 
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dn dn 
Corollary 2 
Let effort be controlled by students. B Let ~ =0, and let 
-U' 'jut be sufficiently small. Then 
d~ > 0 d~ > 0 
dn dn 
An increase in the number of students per (full-time) worker 
requires larger repayments per. worker. 
increase in effort is one way of achieving this, since it 
increases the size of the skilled labor force. The government, 
however, cannot directly enforce a higher effort. As long as 
students are not too risk-averse, the government, as an 
incentive to raise effort, creates a larger net wage 
differential by shifting the burden of repayments towards 
unskilled workers. Moreover, such a change in the terms of 
repayment induces a longer education, which further enhances 
the government's ability to fund education. 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter extends the theory of education by 
modelling the problem of moral hazard, and generalizes 
principal-agent theory by allowing the agent to choose the 
length of the principal-agent relationship. 
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A number of issues have been investigated. The first is 
the reaction of students to the government's provision of 
insurance against low future incomes (Propositions 1 and 4). 
It is found that with regard to the choice of education, 
students may react in opposite ways depending on whether they 
or the government control(s) the level of student effort. If 
the government controls effort, then an increase in the extent 
of insurance induces a higher level of education, because it 
raises the marginal utility from education and lowers the 
marginal cost of failure. If students control effort, and if 
effort rather than education levels significantly affect the 
chances of graduating, then an increase in insurance has the 
opposite effect on the level of education. The reason is that 
better coverage reduces the incentive to study. If this causes 
a relatively large fall in the probability of graduating, then 
students choose a shorter education. 
A second issue is the degree of insurance that is 
socially optimal (Propositions 2 and 5). Existing 
principal-agent results imply that, for a given level of 
education, if the government controls students' effort, then it 
is socially optimal to fully insure future income, while 
partial insurance is optimal if students control effort. It is 
shown that these results extend to the case where the level of 
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education is variable as long as it does not affect the 
probability of graduating. However, if a longer education 
reduces the probability of graduating, then full insurance is 
suboptimal even if the government controls effort. The reason 
is that endogeneity of education essentially creates a second 
moral hazard problem. The government should use the loan 
scheme to induce a shorter education. If the government is 
able to control effort this can be achieved by a reduction in 
insurance. If the government is unable to control effort then 
the socially optimal course depends on whether the probability 
of graduating is affected more strongly by changes in effort or 
changes in education levels. If changes in effort (education) 
are the dominant influence, then an increase (reduction) in 
insurance is optimal. 
If the government must implement a self-financing loan 
scheme, whereby workers' loan repayments completely finance new 
student loans, then it may be of interest to know how changes 
in the population growth rate affect the nature of the optimal 
loan scheme, and thereby the nature of education, and optimal 
levels of skill. This is described in Propositions 3 and 6 and 
Corollaries 1 and 2 for a model in which the probability of 
graduating depends only on the level of effort. It is shown 
that if the government controls effort, it will fund additional 
loans by raising the level of effort and repayments regardless 
of whether the student graduates. If the government is unable 
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to control effort, it will reduce (increase) the repayment of 
(un) skilled workers to motivate students. Whether or not the 
government controls effort, students choose a higher level of 
education. Hence, the model suggests that higher population 
growth rates are associated with higher levels of skill, and, 
if moral hazard is present, it suggests that higher population 
growth rates are also associated with greater exposure to risk. 
These comparative results are dependent on the assumption that 
the loan is fixed. It is conjectured that the level of skill 
may (although need not) decrease in response to higher 
population growth. 
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5.6 APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1 
- -Let W=W(B). Total differentiation of (5.3.1) gives 
The result follows from Cramer's rule. • 
Proof of Proposition 2 
A 
Let L be the Lagrangian of the problem in (5.2.10), and let T 
A A A 
be the multiplier associated with (5.2.8). If (~O'~l,Q) is an 
interior solution, then it satisfies 
(5.6.1) 
i=O,l [ 
1-~ 
~ 
where Wand B are evaluated at the optimum. 
if i=o 
if i=l 
=> 
which implies 
1\' 
(5.6.2) rU' (C i ) L 
1\ 1\ 
( a) Let ¢o ~ ¢ l' 
= ;[1 + 
Then 
1\ 
'Tr 
1\ 
C < 
0 
1\13 
'Tr 
1\ 
'Tr 
1\ 
C1 
, 't' d 13 us~ng Propos~ ~on 1 an 'Tr <0. 
i=O,1 since 
1\ ; ) as 1 (¢ - i=O,1 1 o a¢, 
~ 
and 
=> using (5.6.2) 
1\ 1\ 1\ 1\ 
which contradicts the fact that Co< C1 ° Hence ¢o < ¢1' 
(b) and 
1\ 1\ 
=> ¢o < ¢1 
=> using proposition 1 
139 
140 
=> using (5.6.2) 
which gives a contradiction. Hence, if ~B<o, then Co < C1 ' 
i=O,l 
=> 
Proof of Proposition 3 
B Given ~ =0, the first-order conditions of problem (5.2.10) are 
(5.6.3) i=O,l 
(5.6.4) 
(5.6.5) 
Total differentiation of (5.6.3)-(5.6.5) gives 
l\¢Jo¢J o l\¢J o
r 1\ 
L 0 ° L d¢Jo ° 
I\¢J 1¢J 1 1\¢J 1 a 1\¢J 1 r 1\ 
0 L L L d¢J 1 ° (5.6.6) = 
l\ a ¢J 1 I\aa I\ar 1\ 
0 L L L da 0 
I\r¢J I\ r ¢J 1 I\ra 1\ L 0 L L 0 dr dn 
141 
where 
/\ 
1 - 71' 
where B is evaluated at the optimum. The result follows from 
Cramer's rule, the first and second-order conditions and 
Assumptions 1-3. • 
Proof of Corollary 1 
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1\ 
dB by Propositions 1 and 3. 
dn 81>0 dn 81>1 dn 80: dn 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Let W5W(~,~). Total differentiation of (5.4.1)-(5.4.2) gives 
WO:O: -0:13 w d~ _0:1>0 -w 
_0:1>1 
-w d1>o 
= 
-130: w -1313 W dB 
_131>0 
-w 
_131>1 
-w d1>l 
where 
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The result follows from Cramer's rule, the first and 
second-order conditions, and Assumptions 1-3. • 
Proof of Proposition 5 
* * * Let L be the Lagrangian of the problem in (5.2.12). If (¢O'¢l) 
is an interior solution, then it satisfies 
(5.6.7) 
**B[* * J8B ** + T~ ¢1-¢ ___ + T~].' = ° 
o 8¢. 
]. 
i=O,l 
where W, 0; and B are evaluated at the optimum. 
* + q* _* 1 [~a a~ *B - j * ~ 8B i=O, => -rU' (c. ) L ¢1 ¢o ---- + + T = ° ]. * 8¢. * 8¢. ~i ]. ~i ]. 
using -0; -B W =W =0. 
*¢o *<Pl = -rL[UI (~o) U'(~l)J => L - L -
+ ~ [* _ * 1 [ ~a a~ *0; 80; *B 8B *B afi 1 ~ + ~ ~ = ° <P1 <Po -- -- --* 8<p * 8<P 1 * 8¢o * 8<P 1 1-~ 0 ~ 1-~ ~ 
* * rL[U ' (~o) - U I (~l) ] => 4> - 4> = 1 0 
[ *0 *Ct. *13 *13 - 8B * 7r 8Ct. 7r 8Ct. + 7r 7r as 1 
r l-~ - -84>0 * 84>1 * 84>0 * 84>1 7r l-7r 7r 
The numerator is positive if (5.4.1) holds. The first two 
terms in the denominator are positive by Proposition 4. 
Let 17rCt./7r13 1 be relatively small. Then 
< ° and > ° 
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so that, given 13 7r <0, the last two terms in the denominator are 
also positive. Let 17rCt./7r 13 1 be relatively large. Then the last 
two terms in the denominator are negative, but outweighed by 
* * the first two terms. Hence 4>1-4>0 > 0. • 
Proof of Proposition 6 
13 Given 7r =0, the first-order conditions of problem (5.2.12) are 
(5.6.8) i=O,l 
(5.6.9) 
where Ct. is evaluated at the optimum. 
Total differentiation of (5.6.8)-(5.6.9) gives 
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*1>01>0 
L *1>01>1 L 
*1> 7 d* L 0 1>0 ° 
*1>11>0 *1>11>1 *1> 17 * L L L d1>l = 0 
*71>0 
L 
*71>1 
L 0 d~ dn 
where 
i=O,l 
The result follows from Cramer's rule, the first and 
second-order conditions, Assumptions 1-3, and the assumption 
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that the degree of risk-aversion is sufficiently small. • 
Proof of Corollary 2 
* - * * ~ - * * so that Q == Q(cpo(n) ,CP1 (n)) and == B(cpo(n) ,CP1(n)), 
d~ = 8Q d;o + 8Q * dCP1 > 0 by Propositions 4 and 6; and 
dn 8cpo dn 8CP1 dn 
* * d~ 8B dcpo + 8B dCP1 > 0 by Propositions 4 and 6. = --dn 8cpo dn 8CP1 dn • 
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5.7 NOTES 
1. In the present model students act as agents and the 
government acts as the principal. 
2. The poss~bility of double moral hazard, with students 
choosing suboptimal levels of education and effort, is similar 
to the problems discussed in Chapter 3. See also note 12 
below. 
3. This model modifies and extends the model used by Eaton 
and Rosen (1980). 
4. A change in the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor 
affects the marginal product of skilled relative to unskilled 
labor, and in a competitive world, affects the skilled relative 
to unskilled wage. This effect will be incorporated in Chapter 
6. 
5. The individual also has time for leisure. The 
allocation of time to leisure and productive activities is not 
considered. 
6. Each period should be thought of as consisting of a 
certain number of days. Each day consists of an exogenous 
number of productive hours and leisure hours. B measures the 
number of productive hours in each day allocated to attending 
school. a measures the number of leisure hours allocated to 
study. During the remainder of the day the individual performs 
unskilled work. 
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7. This assumes a direct relationship between the time 
spent in the education system and the level of the associated 
degree. 
8. The analysis does not consider the dynamic properties of 
the model. 
9. This assumes ~U>O. B If ~u<o the term rn ~u measures a 
benefit from education. The cost interpretation is given here 
and below, because it will be shown that ~u<o is suboptimal. 
10. Having made the choice to have an education, (this is 
A 
implicit in the assumption that B is an internal solution) the 
net income of an unskilled worker is not relevant in 
determining the optimal level of education. 
11. If the taxation/subsidy interpretation is adopted this 
suggests that progressive taxation is optimal. 
B 
12. When K <0 problems (5.2.10) and (5.2.12) resemble 
problems (3.3.6) and (3.3.7). The solution to (3.3.6) 
identified in Chapter 3 is full insurance of the return to the 
agent, inducing him to let the principal control B. That is 
not optimal in this case, because even with full insurance 
(Co=C
l
) the expected utility of the individual is not 
independent of B. 
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CHAPTER 6 
INCENTIVES IN A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EDUCATION MODEL 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The model of Chapter 5 is restricted by the assumption 
that foregone earnings are the only cost of education. For 
instance, there is no explicit modelling of the labor required 
to train students. Secondly, all individuals choose to educate 
themselves before entering the workforce. Thirdly, the effect 
of changes in the composition of the workforce on relative 
wages is ignored. As such, the model is not a general 
equilibrium model. 
Manning (1975, 1976, 1985) describes a model in which 
skilled workers are diverted from the production of consumer 
goods in order to become educators. The cost of education to 
students is the cost of tuition to cover educators' salaries as 
well as the cost of students' foregone earnings. The model 
adds realism by allowing individuals to follow different career 
paths. Some individuals choose unskilled jobs, while others 
invest in education and, upon graduating, choose between jobs 
in the education or consumer goods sectors. Further, real 
wages are determined endogenously. 
The relevance of the model to principal-agent theory is 
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as follows. The government (which acts as a principal) hires 
educators (who act as agents) to train students. The effort of 
the educators is productive in the sense that it raises the 
probability that students graduate. Since graduates are more 
productive (and,hence consume more) than failures, each student 
has an interest in high effort on the part of his educator. 
But, if effort generates disutility, then educators have an 
incentive to shirk. That is, a moral hazard problem arises. 
The remedy comes from the principal-agent literature, namely 
that the contract, which the government offers to educators, 
should contain penalties for a low graduation rate. 
The government's role in education is purely as an 
intermediary, channeling payment from students to educators. 
Equally well, each student can write a contract with the 
educator of his class. Tuition fees would then be dependent on 
whether the student graduates. The model assumes that all 
individuals are risk-neutral, so that students are not harmed 
by the fact that tuition fees are uncertain. (If students are 
risk-averse, they can each write a side contract with an 
insurance company.) 
The model generalizes existing principal-agent theory by 
taking into account aspects of general equilibrium. In 
particular, the number of agents (the educators) in the present 
model is endogenously determined. Their opportunity cost, 
which is the skilled wage in the consumer good sector plus the 
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-disutility from effort is also endogenous (that is, U in 
constraint (1.2.1) in Chapter I is endogenous). These 
generalizations complicate a comparative analysis. 
To simplify the analysis, issues of insurance, which are 
emphasized in Chapter 5, are ignored by assuming that educators 
are risk-neutral. This enables the government to write a 
contract, which completely eliminates moral hazard. At issue 
are the characterization of such a contract, and adjustments in 
the terms of the contract to changes in the environment. 
The following section introduces moral hazard into 
Manning's model. section 6.3 characterizes the optimal levels 
of skill and effort, and the contract which the planner would 
offer to educators, if the planner could observe their 
activities. section 6.4 considers the case where the planner 
cannot observe those activities, describes a contract which 
implements the optimal level of effort, and derives some 
comparative steady state results. 
6.2 A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EDUCATION MODEL 
Consider the following planning model specified in the 
papers by Manning. At any point in time, a labor force L 
consists of skilled (S) and unskilled (U) workers; that is, 
L = S + U 
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The labor force is engaged either in a consumer good sector or 
an education sector. 
In the consumer good sector skilled (X) and unskilled 
(Y) workers produce a consumer good (C): 
C = f(X,Y) 
where f is a concave, constant returns to scale production 
t ' 1,2 func 1on. 
In the education sector educators (who are drawn from 
the skilled workforce and are denoted E) train students (who 
belong to the unskilled workforce and are denoted T) producing 
graduates (G) by way of a fixed coefficients production 
function. Specifically, if s=T/E is an exogenously given 
student-staff ratio, and r is an exogenously given graduation 
rate, then 
G = Esr 
Let n be the population growth rate, and let m be the 
death rate of skilled workers. Then, under balanced growth, a 
proportion v=n+m of the total skilled workforce must be 
replaced by new graduates; that is, 
(6.2.1) Esr = vS 
Given the needs of the education sector, and given the 
requirement of balanced growth, the labor available for 
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consumer good production can be written in per capita terms as 
X S-E v S x == == = (6.2.2) - (1-_)a a==_ 
L L sr L 
y Y L-S-T 1 (1+~)a == == = -(<5.2.3) 
L- L r 
so that per capita consumption under balanced growth is 
(6.2.4) c == c = f((I-~)a,I-(I+~)a) 
L sr r 
Assuming that consumption of the consumer good alone 
generates utility, a planner chooses the proportion of skilled 
labor which maximizes per capita consumption. Thus, the 
planner solves 
Max c s.t. (6.2.4) 
a 
This generates the result that at a welfare maximum 
1+ v 
(6.2.5) 
fX 
= r 
fY I- v 
sr 
In words, the rate at which skilled labor can be substituted 
for unskilled labor in the production of the consumer good 
equals the rate at which unskilled labor can be transformed 
into skilled labor, after netting out the labor requirements of 
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the education sector. 
The model is now extended by making the graduation rate 
explicitly dependent on the quality of students, and effort of 
the educator. Suppose that there are many identical classes, 
each with one educator and s students. The outcome in each 
class is either a low graduation rate r
l
, or a high graduation 
rate r2 . An educator can increase the probability ~, that a 
high proportion of his class graduates, by exerting more 
effort. Let a€[~,aJ denote an educator's effort. Assume that 
the educator's effort is subject to diminishing returns. Then 
a aa ~=~(a), with ~ (·»0 and ~ (.)<0. Under these circumstances, 
if a class performs poorly (if r
l 
is observed for that class), 
the cause may be a lack of talent or effort3 on the part of 
students, or shirking by the educator. 
It is assumed that the probability function ~ is 
independent across classes, so that, given sufficiently many 
classes, the actual graduation rate r for the entire student 
population equals the expected class graduation rate; that is, 
The balanced growth condition in (6.2.1) and the definitions of 
x and y in (6.2.2) and (6.2.3) therefore still apply. However, 
r is now determined endogenously. 
The planner must choose the welfare-maximizing levels of 
skill and effort. If consumption of the good alone affects the 
level of utility, then, since 
where ~r=r2-r1i the optimal choice of effort is the maximum 
level a. However, if effort involves a utility cost, then 
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society will generally prefer an output level that is below the 
maximum level. 
It is assumed that individuals have identical tastes and 
regard a unit of the good in consumption as good as a unit 
saved in effort. On the basis of this, the planner maximizes 
total output of the good net of the quantity of output, which 
would just compensate educators for their effort. Let A be the 
total effort by educators. Then given the constant marginal 
rate of sUbstitution between the good and effort in consumption 
(and given suitable units of measuring utility), the planner 
maximizes C-A. 
Although individuals have identical tastes, actual 
utility derived from consumption of the good or from effort 
need not be identical. For example, educators exert effort, so 
that their disutility from effort exceeds that of skilled 
workers in the consumer good sector. However, if an 
equilibrium is to prevail, educators must consume more of the 
good as compensation. More generally, equilibrium requires 
that, even if individuals have different careers, they must 
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expect the same lifetime utility level. The planner therefore 
maximizes representative utility, or 
W == 
C-A 
L 
From (6.2.1), under balanced growth the number of educators is 
vs/sr, so that effort per head of the popu1ation4 is 
A = 
L 
Va 
_Q 
sr 
and W becomes 
(6.2.6) Va W=c-_Q 
sr 
The planner wants to be able to implement the optimal 
1\ 
level of effort Q, which is found (along with the optimal level 
1\ 
of skill a) by solving 
(6.2.7) Max C _ Va _Q 
a Q sr 
s.t. (6.2.4) 
If the planner is able to observe the educator's effort, 
then he can offer each educator a forcing contract of the form 
described in the principal-agent literature (see, for instance, 
Harris and Raviv, 1979). Such a contract is described in 
section 6.3. 
If effort is not observable, then the planner can only 
induce educators to choose the optimal level of effort. In the 
principal-agent literature it has been shown that, if agents 
are risk-neutral, then the optimum can be implemented. This 
also holds for the present model. section 6.4 derives the 
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contract in terms of the optimal values which the planner 
wishes to implement. A characterization of the optimum is now 
given. 
6.3 OPTIMAL LEVELS OF SKILL AND EFFORT 
1\ 1\ 
An interior solution (a,a:) to (6.2.7) must satisfy 
(1-~_Jfx (1+~)fY v 1\ (6.3.1) a: = 0 
1\ 1\ 1\ 
sr r sr 
1\1\a: 1\ (: fX+ fY) 1\1\a: 1\ 1\ 1\ Varr f..r Varr t:.r v (6.3.2) + a: - a = 0 
1\2 s s22 
1\ 
r sr 
Condition (6.3.1) extends the result in (6.2.5). The first two 
terms measure the extra consumption generated by a marginal 
increase in the level of per capita skill. The third term 
measures the loss in welfare from the effort put forth by the 
additional educators needed to produce the additional skill. 
At a welfare maximum the marginal benefit from the gain in (per 
capita) consumption equals the marginal cost from the increase 
in (per capita) effort. 
Rearranging (6.3.1) gives an alternative interpretation, 
namely 
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A 1 AX Va f -
A (1-~) 1+ V Sr A A 
(6.3.3) sr = r 
fY I- V - A 
sr 
or, the marginal rate of substituting skilled for unskilled 
5 
labor in the consumer good sector (holding welfare constant) 
equals the marginal rate of transforming unskilled into skilled 
labor. 
In contrast to Manning's result in (6.2.5), (6.3.3) 
implies 
1+ V AX -f A 
> r 
(6.3.4) 
Ay 
f I- V 
A 
sr 
Intuitively, the cost of a skilled worker, in terms of the 
unskilled labor needed in its production (the right-hand side 
expression) is smaller than the amount of unskilled labor that 
can be saved by using one more skilled worker in the consumer 
good sector. The difference reflects the cost of the effort 
needed to produce the additional skilled worker. 
Condition (6.3.4) may be illustrated diagrammatically 
using figure 2 in Manning (1985), which is reproduced in Figure 
6.8.1. It shows society's input possibilities frontier, and 
isoquants of the consumer good production function. When 
output is maximized (6.2.5) holds, and the corresponding 
isoquant is tangential to the input possibilities frontier 
(point a). (6.3.3) implies that at a welfare maximum, the 
relevant isoquant is steeper than the input possibilities 
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frontier (see point b), so that (as suggested in section 6.2) 
output is not maximized. Further, given the same input 
possibilities, the levels of ouput and skill are lower than in 
Manning's model. 
Condition (6.3.2) is explained as follows. The term 
"''''Q '" "'2 
Van br/r measures the effect of a marginal increase in effort 
on the number of students who can be released from the 
education sector, while maintaining a given level of skill. 
"''''Q '" "'2 Given the fixed coefficients technology (lis) (Van br/r ) is the 
number of educators who are simultaneously released. Hence, 
the first term in (6.3.2) measures the benefit to society, in 
terms of additional consumption, from a marginal increase in 
effort. The second term measures the gain from effort saved by 
the release of educators. However, the increase in effort 
involves a direct cost - effort by existing educators increases 
(on a per capita basis), the cost of which is the third term in 
(6.3.2). Thus, at the optimal level of effort, the social 
marginal cost and benefit of effort are equal. 
Rearranging (6.3.2) gives 
Aa A 
~ ~r (~ fX+ fY) 
A s 
(6.3.5) r = 1 
:(1-
Aa A 
A ~ ~r a) 
S A r 
In words, the marginal rate of transforming effort into the 
consumer good by way of a release of labor from education to 
6 the consumer good sector equals the marginal rate of 
sUbstitution between effort and the good in consumption. 
A A 
The optimal values a and a determine the optimal 
AX 
competitive (real) skilled wage f , and hence the amount of 
AX A 
tuition charged to students, namely l/s(f +a), which induces 
A 
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skilled workers to accept jobs as educators. The effort a is 
implemented by way of a forcing contract such as described in 
A 
Harris and Raviv (1979). Thus, if c is the optimal payment per 
educator, the contract offered by the planner to each educator 
is 
A fX+ A A C = a if a = a 
(6.3.6) 
A A 
c = 0 if a ~ a 
The parameters in the model are the technology in 
education (s, r , r ) 7, and the rate at which skilled labor 
1 2 
must be replaced by graduates to maintain balanced growth (v -
referred to below as the replacement rate). The effects of 
changes in these parameters on the optimal levels of skill and 
effort are derived in Appendix I, and summarized in Table 1. 
A 
Q 
s 
+ 
+ 
Table 18 ,9 
v 
+ + 
+ + 
Table 1 shows that an increase in the student-staff 
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ratio raises the optimal levels of skill and effort. Since the 
graduation rate does not depend on the student-staff ratio, an 
increase in this ratio means that each educator has become more 
productive. Skilled labor on average (combining educators and 
skilled workers in consumer good production) therefore has a 
higher marginal product, which raises the optimal level of 
skill. 
Since effort has the properties of a public good, 
(within limits, new students in a class can benefit as well as 
the existing students from a given level of effort by the 
educator), an increase in the student-staff ratio makes effort 
more productive, and raises the optimal level of effort. This 
is the direct effect of an increase in s. 
There is also an indirect effect, caused by the increase 
in the optimal level of skill. On the one hand, a greater 
level of skill lowers the marginal product of skilled labor fX; 
on the other hand, since more students are diverted to the 
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education sector, the marginal product of unskilled labor fY 
rises. Suppose that the second effect dominates. Then, the 
greater is s, the greater is the change in fX+sfY. Now this 
term measures the output gained from releasing one educator and 
s students through an increase in effort. The larger this 
benefit from more effort, the higher the optimal level of 
effort. In this case, the indirect effect reinforces the 
direct effect. If instead a fall in fX dominates the rise in 
f Y, then an increase in s has a negative indirect effect on 
optimal effort. In either case, the second-order conditions 
require that the indirect effect be relatively small. 
An increase in the graduation rates r
l 
or r
2 
raises the 
expected graduation rate of a given class, and the actual 
graduation rate for the total student population. This means 
that the production of skill requires a smaller quantity of 
resources (labor and effort) and therefore raises the optimal 
level of skill. 
The higher the expected graduation rate, the cheaper the 
production of a given level of skill. If r 2 increases, the 
expected graduation rate increases more, the higher the level 
of effort. Hence, increases in r make effort more productive. 
2 
In contrast, a given increase in r
l 
raises the expected 
graduation rate more, the lower the level of effort. This 
explains the optimality of higher effort when r 2 increases, and 
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lower effort when ~1 increases. 
A higher replacement rate implies that more students and 
educators are needed in a~y given period to maintain a given 
level of per capita skill in future periods. By thus 
increasing the output loss as well as the total effort, the 
marginal cost of (per capita) skill rises. Since skill 
(embodied in educators) and effort are substitutes in the 
production of graduates, this suggests that more effort should 
be expanded in education. 
6.4 FORCING CONTRACTS WHEN EFFORT IS UNOBSERVABLE 
Suppose that effort is unobservable, so that the 
government cannot specify effort in a contract. The principal-
agent literature has shown that, when the agent is risk-
neutral, the optimal action can be implemented by means of 
suitably specified payments (for instance, Shavell, 1979b). 
such a forcing contract is derived below for the present 
general equilibrium model. Since the contract is written 
exclusively in terms of the variables derived in section 6.3, 
the results in Table I, and the properties of f and n are 
sufficient to derive some comparative steady state results 
about the nature of the contract. 
As supposed in the discussion of section 6.3, students 
pay the planner tuition fees to finance the salaries of 
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educators. When effort is observable, the planner pays 
educators an amount just covering the wage they could have 
earned in the consumer goqd sector plus an amount to compensate 
for the disutility from effort. The payment is independent of 
the observed graduation rate. If the graduation rate is low, 
the planner realizes that the educator has drawn a class of low 
quality. 
When effort is unobservable the planner motivates 
educators by paying a larger amount if a class has a high 
graduation rate, on the basis that a high graduation rate is 
evidence of high effort. Let c l and 02 denote the payment to 
each educator in the event of a low and high graduation rate, 
respectively. since the educator is risk-neutral the risk of 
receiving a low payment in the event that he draws a poor class 
does not generate a utility loss. However, to attract skilled 
workers into the education sector, they must be paid at least 
their opportunity cost. For example, if the planner wants to 
A A 
implement a level of skill a and a level of effort a, then the 
contract (c l ,02) must satisfy 
(6.4.1) 
where the left-hand side measures an educator's expected 
utility level. This is the general equilibrium version of the 
participation constraint in the principal-agent model. It 
differs in that the opportunity cost of an educator is 
165 
determined endogenously (as described in section 6.3). If 
educators do not receive at least an expected wage covering the 
skilled wage plus compensation for effort, then skilled workers 
will take jobs in the consumer good sector until the marginal 
return to both types of skilled labor is equalized. 
To ensure that an educator chooses the optimal level of 
effort a, the planner must make the contract compatible with 
the choices of the educator. The contract must satisfy the 
incentive-compatibility constraint 
Simultaneously solving (6.4.1) and (6.4.2) gives the contract 
A A 
(c
1
,c
2
), where 
A 
(6.4.3) 
A AX A 'If 
C = f + a -1 
A 
This differs from the payment c, defined in (6.3.6), only in 
the third terms in (6.4.3) which quantify the incentives in the 
A A A A 
contract. Since the contracts (c
1
,c
2
) and (c,a) both implement 
the optimal effort, the only difference between a world in 
which effort is observable and one in which effort is 
A A Aa 
unobservable are the penalties (c2-c1 )=1/'If imposed in the 
latter case. In this world, ex post, some educators are worse 
off than others, not because they shirked, but because they 
drew a poor class. However, penalties are necessary to prevent 
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shirking. 
The planner changes the optimal penalty in response to 
changes in the environment (s, r
1
,r
2
). The optimal adjustments 
are derived in Appendix 2, section 6.7, and are summarized in: 
Table 2 
s v 
+ + + 
An increase in the student-staff ratio gives each 
educator a larger class, so that the educator's effort becomes 
more important. The optimal penalty for (perceived) poor 
performance therefore increases. 
If r 2 increases or r 1 decreases, the cost of a poor 
class performance increases. A larger penalty in the event of 
a low graduation rate is therefore optimal. 
A higher replacement rate implies that more resources 
are needed to maintain the production of skill. Effort is one 
such resource and more can be obtained by higher penalties. 
The planner must determine not only optimal contracts 
for educators, but also tuition fees to students. Although the 
wage of an individual educator is uncertain, the total wage 
bill faced by the planner is determinate, because there are 
many educators. Hence, the planner knows with certainty how 
much tuition to charge to students. The effect on tuition fees 
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of changes in the parameters depends on how those changes 
AX A 
affect the optimal skilled wage f , and the optimal effort Q. 
Unfortunately, unambiguous results require more specific 
knowledge of the funtions f and n. A definite result is 
available only for the effect of a change in the student-staff 
ratio. If this ratio increases, then the optimal skilled wage 
falls, and the share which each student must contribute to the 
compensation of educators also falls. Although the optimal 
effort of each educator increases and requires compensation, as 
11 long as the maximum effort is sufficiently small, tuition 
fees on a per student basis fall. 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
In the context of a balanced growth model in which a 
planner determines the allocation of labor to the education and 
consumer good sectors, and the effort desired from educators, 
conditions are derived characterizing a welfare-maximum. It is 
shown that, at a welfare-maximum, the marginal rate of 
substituting skilled for unskilled labor in the production of 
the good, equals the marginal rate of transforming unskilled 
into skilled labor through education. Also, the marginal rate 
of transforming effort into th~ good by a release of labor from 
education equals the marginal rate of substituting effort for 
the good in consumption. 
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since an educator's effort has benefits (namely, an 
increase in the productivity of his students) wh~ch are not 
privately captured, the planner may face moral hazard if he is 
unable to observe the educator's activities. A penalty on the 
educator in the, event of a low graduation rate in the 
educator's class can alleviate the moral hazard. If the 
educator is risk-neutral, a penalty can completely eliminate 
moral hazard. This is familiar from the prinicipal-agent 
literature. However, in the present model, the planner must 
calculate the optimal penalty in a world where the number of 
educators, as well as their opportunity cost are endogenously 
determined. 
The planner solves for the optimal penalty in two 
stages, first calculating the optimal levels of skill and 
effort, and then choosing performance-dependent payments. The 
planner must make sure that the payments equate the expected 
return to skilled labor across sectors. This is a general 
equilibrium version of the participation constraint in the 
conventional prinicpal-agent model. At the same time, the 
penalty implicit in the payments must induce educators to 
choose the optimal level of effort. 
The comparative steady state results show that the 
optimal penalty is larger, the higher the student-staff ratio, 
the higher the graduation rate of classes which perform well, 
the lower the graduation rate of classes which perform poorly, 
and the higher the rate at which skilled workers must be 
produced to maintain balanced growth. 
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6.6 APPENDIX 1 - DERIVATION OF TABLE 1 
Total differentiation of (6.3.1) and (6.3.2) gives the 
system of equations (evaluated at the optimum): 
[waa w
a
" I [da I _WO"s O"r 1 O"r 2 _WO"v ds -w -W (6.6.1) = o:r 1 0: r.2 wO:O" wO:O: do: _Wo: s -w -w _Wo:v dr 
1 
dr 
2 
dv 
where, given sufficiently small f XY , defining 
v v V 
T= - 0=1-_ €=1+_ 
r sr r 
and noting that 
8T = _vnO:t:,r < 0 and 
80: r2 
8
2
T _vt:,r(r 0:0: 2nO:nO:t:,r) n > 0 = 
80: 2 r3 
WO"O"::;;: 02 f XX+ €2fYY < 0 
WO"O:::;;: -~(~ fX+ f Y+ ':0: ) T O"~(o': fXX_ € fYY) 
80: s s S 80: S 
= -a~(o: fXx_ €fYY ) 
80: s 
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which is relatively small by the second-order condition for 
a maximum. 
waS~ 1" (fX+ 0: + oaf xx) 
s2 
> 0 if 
fXX 
is sufficiently small 
ar 1 w ~ a (1-11') 1" (: fX+ f Y+ :ofXX_ €fYY) + 0:(1-11')1" 
r s s 
> 0 if 
fXX 
is sufficiently small 
fX 
ar 2 a1l'1" (: fX+ f Y+ :ofxx_ €fYY ) + 0:11'1" w ~ 
r s s sr 
> 0 if -
fXX 
is sufficiently small 
fX 
wav~ _ 1 (: fX+ f Y+ :0:) ~(o: fXx_ €fYY) 
r s r s s 
< 0 
fXX 
if - is sufficiently small 
fX 
sr 
wO:O:::::; a
2r (.: fX+ -Cl 
ao: 2 s 
0:0: ar (.: = 7r - Cl --0: ao: s 
7r 
< 0 
wo:s::::; Cl ~( fX+ 0: 
s2 ao: 
f Y+ ':0: ) 
s 
fX+ f Y+ 
s 
= Cl ~(-fY+ Clr fXX) 
s ao: s2 
> 0 
o:r 1 0: ':0:) w ~ _~(':fX+ f Y+ 
r s s 
Cl(l-7r)r 2 + - Cl (l-7r)r 
sr r 
-2 Cl ar + (Cl~)2(~ fXX+ fYY) 
s ao: ao: s2 
0:) + (Cl~)2(': fXX+ fYY) 
ao: s 
s 
+ 2Cl(1-7r) ~(':fX+ f Y+ ':0:) 
r ao: s S 
~(~ fXX+ fYY) 
ao: s2 
Cl~(~ 1-7r) (: :0: ) 2 ~(~fXX+ = + fX+ f Y+ _Cl (l-7r)r 
ao: b.r r s s r ao: s2 
< 0 
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fYY) 
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~) C:fX+ fY + ':0:) 
r s s 
using Wo:= 0 
> 0 if -
fXX 
and 
fYY 
are sufficiently small12 -
fX fY 
Wo:v "", ~(.: fX+ f Y+ ':0: ) 2 8r (-=-- fXX+ fYY) a + ar + a -
V 80: S S vs r 80: s2 
> 0 
The second order conditions for a welfare-maximum require 
Hence, it is required that WoO: is sufficiently small. 
The results in Table 1 follow from the application of Cramer's 
rule to (6.6.1), and the properties of f and ~. 
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6.7 APPENDIX 2 - DERIVATION OF TABLE 2 
Defining '7 = > 0 and using the results in Table 1 gives 
ex ex 
11" 11" 
the following response of the optimal penalty to parameter 
changes: 
ac2-c1 aex > 0 = '7_ 
as as 
ac2-c1 = aex < 0 '7 __ 
ar 1 ar 1 
ac2-c1 = aex > 0 '7 __ 
ar 2 ar 2 
ac2-c1 aex > 0 = '7_ 
av av 
6.8 FIGURES 
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6.9 NOTES 
l. The following notation is used: 
fXE af 
A A 
f - f(·) 
ax 
2 . 
at the 
It is assumed that skilled workers are more productive 
margin than unskilled workers (fX>fY), so that it always 
pays to use (un) skilled workers for (un) skilled tasks. 
3. Unlike the model in Chapter 5, effort by students is not 
considered a variable. Thus, issues of moral hazard on the 
part of students are not relevant. Students should be thought 
of in terms of their characteristics such as "talented", 
"lazy", and so on. 
4. To be distinguished from effort per educator which is 
measured by ex, 
5. v 
sr 
1 
1-~ 
sr 
is the number of educators needed to generate v 
skilled workers. 
is the number of new skilled workers needed to make 
available 1 skilled worker to the consumer good sector. 
v Hence, 1 ex is the disutility from the effort of new 
sr 1-~ 
sr 
educators required to produce one skilled worker for the 
consumer good sector, so that the numerator in the left-hand 
side of (6.3.3) measures the net welfare effect (from extra 
consumption and effort) from an additional skilled worker in 
the consumer good sector. Multiplying by the number of 
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unskilled workers which, when released from the consumer good 
sector, generate a unit loss in welfare (l/fY), gives the 
required marginal rate of sUbstitution. 
6 . 
AQ A A 
On the left-hand side of (6.3.5), n ~r/r measures the 
proportion of students who can be released due to a marginal 
increase in effort by all educators. Hence, per student, 
AQ A A AQ A A 
n ~r/r unskilled workers and n ~r/sr skilled workers can be 
released to the output sector. The numerator in the left-hand 
side therefore measures the output gain per student from the 
increase in effort. Further, 1 in the denominator measures the 
AQ A A A 
increase in effort per educator while (n ~r/r)Q measures (on a 
per educator basis) the effort saved from a reduction in the 
AQ A A A 
number of educators. Multiplying l-(n ~r/r)Q by lis gives the 
net increase in effort on a per student basis. The left-hand 
side therefore measures the amount of output gained per unit of 
the additional effort; that is, it is the marginal rate of 
transforming effort into the consumer good by way of a release 
of labor from education to the consumer good sector. 
7. Changes in the functional form of n, which also 
characterizes the technology in education, are not considered. 
8 . A 
80 > 0 etc. 
8s 
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9. These results require the additional assumption that the 
marginal returns to skilled and unskilled labor diminish 
, 1 xx x YYI Y 1 t' 11) relatlve Y slowly (-f If. and -f fare re a lvely sma . 
They also make use of the fact that fXY is relatively small. 
A 
10. This condition is necessary and sufficient for a to 
maximize the educator's expected utility. 
1 
11. For instance, if n(a)=a 2 a€(O,l), then a~f suffices. 
12. => n > 0 
r 
CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY, CONCLUDING REMARKS AND SUGGESTIONS 
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
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This thesis has investigated issues of moral hazard in a 
variety of contexts not yet fully considered in the principal-
agent literature. 
Chapter 2 uses a Slutsky-like equation to derive 
properties of principal-agent contracts in a conventional 
single agent model. It shows that availability of data on the 
responsiveness of contracts to disturbances in the agent's 
opportunity cost allows predictions about the responsiveness of 
those contracts to disturbances in the outcomes of the 
principal-agent relationship. These predictions depend on 
whether moral hazard is present. 
The analysis is only a first step in the use of Slutsky 
equations in principal-agent theory. While results are given 
for any number of states for a model with enforceable actions, 
the results for the same model with unenforceable actions are 
limited by the assumption, that on~y two outcomes are possible. 
Further, the model is a very simple one, involving a risk-
neutral principal, a single agent and a single time-period. 
Slutsky-like equations should be available also for more 
complicated formulations. 
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Chapter 3 gives a characterization of contracts when the 
principal can choose an action affecting the expected outcome, 
and perceives that the action can be used to motivate the 
agent. The action therefore has incentive effects, as well as 
direct productivity effects, and, as such, differs from 
existing analyses which allow the principal to choose an 
action. 
In some situations the agent may control his own and 
also the principal's action. In this case the principal has to 
trade one form of moral hazard (an undesirable action on the 
part of the agent) against another (a requirement that the 
principal undertake an action that is too costly). The results 
show, that the tradeoff involves the costliest action on the 
part of the principal, in order to avoid the least desirable 
action by the agent. 
In a broader sense, allowing the principal to choose 
actions eliminates one of the asymmetries characteristic of 
most principal-agent models. Chapter 4 eliminates another 
typical asymmetry, namely the assumption that the principal 
alone determines the terms of compensation. When the principal 
chooses an action, and agents bargain for a share of the 
outcome (so that the distiction between principal and agent 
disappears), the model becomes a natural extension of a 
commodity exchange model with uncertain endowments. The 
extension involves the dependence of the probability 
181 
distribution over endowments on the actions of the agents. 
The chapter addresses the question of what contracts 
might be observed as a result of bargaining among agents, using 
the core as the solution concept. The analysis considers a 
class of economies in which coalitions may be confronted with 
moral hazard on the part of other coalitions. It is shown that 
the core exists, implying that instead of multiple coalitions, 
the economy should feature collective agreements about the 
optimal set of actions. The precise form of a contract 
implementing those actions is also given. It is further shown 
that the core satisfies the property that identical agents are 
treated equally, and that the core shrinks to a competitive 
contract as the economy grows large. 
The model leaves room for extension on several fronts. 
The results make use of a number of restrictions on the set of 
technically feasible actions, the probability distribution over 
endowments, and the agents' characteristics. They are a 
sufficient set of restrictions - whether they are also 
necessary is yet to be determined. Further, the extent of 
moral hazard is limited by an assumption, that moral hazard is 
not a problem within coalitions. An immediate, although 
apparently difficult extension, would allow moral hazard within 
as well as across coalitions. 
Chapters 5 and 6 address moral hazard problems in 
education. In chapter 5, government provision of student 
loans, with an implicit insurance policy against low future 
earnings, gives students an incentive to shirk. Since this 
lowers the government's ability to fund future education, 
society has an interest in preventing such behavior. The 
analysis derives optimal levels of insurance when the 
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probability of graduating depends only on students' effort, and 
when that probability also depends on the length of education. 
Also considered is the effect of changes in population growth 
on optimal levels of insurance, effort and skill. 
The contribution of the model to principal-agent theory 
is that optimal levels of insurance are derived in a model in 
which the length of the principal-agent relationship (namely, 
the length of education, during which the government can 
influence students' actions) is endogenous. 
The model is limited by the fact that the loan is 
exogenously given. An immediate extension would make the loan 
a choice variable of the government. 
I 
In Chapter 6 the government hires educators to train 
students. In order to reduce shirking, the government 
penalizes educators whose classes perform poorly. At issue are 
the characterization of the optimal contract, and the optimal 
adjustment of the penalty to exogenous disturbances. 
The significance of the analysis for principal-agent 
theory derives from the fact that the model describes a general 
equilibrium. It determines the proportion of educators (who 
act as agents to students) in the workforce, as well as 
educators' opportunity cost. In the literature these have 
generally been treated as given. 
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The model considers only one aspect of education policy, 
namely the nature of penalties in contracts offered to 
educators. Other issues, such as the properties of tuition 
fees payable by students, and the extent of insurance in 
education, if individuals are risk-averse have yet to be 
considered. 
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